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I. INTRODUCTION 
Federal states, with their internal division of powers, experience particular 
problems when participating in the development of the international legal order. 
While the central government in a federal state generally possesses exclusive 
power to enter into treaties on behalf of the nation, it does not necessarily possess 
the power under the constitution to carry out the terms of the treaty domesti-
cally. It may, therefore, be forced to rely on the cooperation of the constituent 
units of the federation to carry out its obligations. Even where the federal 
government has a virtually unlimited power of treaty implementation, the states 
or provinces may still be able to bring political pressure to bear to influence the 
extent of the federal government's participation in multilateral treaty regimes. 
This article examines the e·tent to which Australia's participation in the 
international legal order has been influenced by its federal system of govern-
ment. The development and judicial exposition of the federal government's 
power to enter into and implement treaties is considered, followed by a discus-
sion of the impact that party politics at the federal and state level has had on the 
exploitation of this power. Next, the article examines Australia's record of 
ratification of a number of multilateral conventions. Finally, the author assesses 
the extent to which the federal system retards Australia's participation in the 
international legal order. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL POWER TO LEGISLATE WITH RESPECT TO 
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 
A. The Australian Federal System 
The Commonwealth of Australia came into existence on January 1, 1901, by 
operation of an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament. 1 At present the federa-
tion consists of six states and various territories, the latter under the control of 
the federal government. The structure of government is a hybrid of the British 
Parliamentary system and the U.S. federal model. 
At the federal level there is a bicameral legislature, which consists of a House 
of Representatives and a Senate. The members of the House are elected by 
1. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900,63 & 64 Viet. eh.12, reprinted (as amended) in 
2 A. BLAUSTEIN & G. FLANZ, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (1983). 
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popular franchise on the basis of individual electoral districts, while Senators are 
elected by voting on a state or territory-wide basis. In addition, there is an 
executive government (appearing in the constitutional garb of the Governor-
General in Council), as well as a supreme judicial tribunal, the High Court of 
Australia. 2 
The parallels to the U.S. model are obvious. One significant variation is, 
however, the relationship between the executive and the legislature: the forma-
tion of a government is the entitlement of the party or coalition of parties with a 
majority of seats in the House of Representatives. 3 
The Australian Constitution's allocation of legislative powers between the 
federal and state legislatures is also modeled on the U.S. Constitution, at times 
even reproducing the wording of that instrument. The federal government is 
one of enumerated powers only, and may only enact legislation with respect to 
specific constitutionally enumerated grants of power. 4 The residue of legislative 
power may be exercised by the states. 5 Although some of the federal govern-
ment's powers are exclusive, most of its legislative powers are concurrent. As a 
result, both the states and the federal government may possess the power to 
legislate on a particular subject matter. 6 In the case of a conflict between federal 
and state law, the state law is deemed to be invalid to the extent of the inconsis-
tency.7 
2. The High Court of Australia is modeled after the U.S. Supreme Court, although a number of 
important differences exist. Established by Chapter III of the Australian Constitution, the Court 
presently consists of seven justices and functions as the supreme appellate tribunal in matters involving 
questions of federal law, including the interpretation of the Australian Constitution. The court also 
possesses original jurisdiction in a number of areas. See AUSTL. CONST., §§ 75-76. In addition, it has 
appellate jurisdiction in relation to questions of state law, and in most cases it is the final appellate court 
on questions of state law, although litigants may still appeal questions of state law directly from the 
supreme courts of the individual states to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London. See 
AUSTL. CaNST. §§ 73-74. 
Generally, each judge of the High Court writes a separate opinion. In some cases the Court issues a 
per curiam opinion, although this is relatively unusual in constitutional cases. Unlike the procedure 
adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the High Court does not assign the writing of the majority opinion 
to a particular judge. Judges will on occasion join the judgments of other judges of the Court, with the 
resulting judgment delivered as a joint judgment, or will confine themselves to concurring in a 
particular judgment. The holding of any particular case is ascertained by aggregating the various 
judgments. In some cases there may be no basis for the decision that is common to a majority of the 
Court. The decisions of the Court bind all other Australian courts, but the Court itself is not bound to 
follow its own earlier decisions. 
3. For an outline of the Westminster system of government inherited by Australia from the United 
Kingdom, see generally O. HOOD PHILLIPS & P. JACKSON, O. HOOD PHILLIP'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 27-30 (0. Hood Phillips & P. Jackson 6th ed. 1978). 
4. See Attorney-General (Cth) v. Colonial Sugar Refining Co., [1914] A.C. 237. 
5. AUSTL. CaNST. § 107. 
6. See id. §§ 106-09. See generally W.A. WYNES, LEGISLATIVE, EXECUTIVE AND JUDICIAL POWERS IN 
AUSTRALIA 93-95 (5th ed. 1976). 
7. AUSTL. CONST. § 109. The position is similar in other federal countries. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 
VI, d. 2; GRUNDGESETZ, arts. 31, 72(1); Attorney-General (Ol1tario) v. Attorney-General (Canada), 
[1896] A.C. 348 Canada. 
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The federal government attempts on occasion to regulate an area not covered 
by an explicit constitutional grant oflegislative power. In such cases,legislation is 
drafted in piecemeal fashion, drawing on the various grants of power in an 
attempt to cover the total problem. This process inevitably produces fragmented 
and often unsatisfactory legislation. For example, the federal government does 
not have the power to regulate employment conditions nationwide under the 
commerce clause.s Therefore, any legislative package attempting to regulate 
terms and conditions of employment throughout the country must draw on the 
federal powers to legislate with respect to interstate trade and commerce,9 
trading and financial corporations,lo conciliation and arbitration for the preven-
tion and settlement of interstate industrial disputes, II external affairs,12 and any 
other available powers. This pattern is repeated whenever the federal govern-
ment seeks to extend its power into new areas perceived to require uniform 
national regulation, but over which it lacks a specific grant of legislative power. 
When the federal government chooses to implement Australia's treaty obliga-
tions by means of federal legislation, it may rely on any of the various powers 
conferred on it by the Constitution, including the power to legislate with respect 
to "external affairs."13 The external affairs power, although viewed by some as 
an important source of untapped legislative power, was not exploited to any 
great extent until the early 1970's due to uncertainty about the extent of the 
power and because of the limited independent participation of Australia in the 
international community until the 1940's. Since the 1970's, the external affairs 
power has been discovered to be a potentially large source of additional power 
available to remedy other inadequacies in federal power. 
B. Development of the Constitutional Provisions Relating to Foreign Affairs l4 
Although the Australian Constitution derived its legal force from an Act of the 
United Kingdom Parliament, the text of the Constitution was largely the product 
of a series of national constitutional conventions held in Australia during the last 
decade of the 19th century. At these conventions, a number of factors were 
considered in deciding what provision should be made in the new Constitution in 
relation to the treaty-making power of the Commonwealth. The United King-
dom had previously had the power to conclude treaties which bound Australia as 
8. See AUSTL. CONST. § 51(1). 
9.Id. 
10. Id. § 51(20). 
II. Id. § 51(35). 
12. Id. § 51(29). 
13. Id. 
14. For a complete discussion of these provisions, see Bailey, Australia and the InternatWnal Labour 
ConventWns, 54 INT'L LAB. REV. 285 (1946). See also Thomson, A United States Guide to Constitutional 
LimitatWns Upon Treaties as a Source of Australian Municipal Law, 13 V.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 110, 112-29 
(1977). 
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part of the British Empire. It was generally believed that this should continue to 
be the case as any attempt to give the new Dominion an independent treaty-
making power would usurp the Imperial monopoly and run the risk of conflict-
ing with the foreign policy of the United Kingdom and other members of the 
Empire. Another factor considered was the U.S. Constitution, which was used as 
an overall model for the Australian Constitutjon. The U.S. Constitution, how-
ever, embodied quite different approaches to both the making and implementa-
tion of treaties than was the case in the British Empire. Finally, there was a desire 
to equip the new Commonwealth with the capacity to adopt the full powers ofa 
sovereign nation as it attained recognition as an independent nation at the 
international level. 
Originally, covering clause 5 of the Constitution 13 contained a clause based on 
Article VI of the U.S. Constitution,'6 whereby "all treaties made by the Com-
monwealth" were to be binding on the courts of every state. '7 In addition, what is 
currently section 51(29) at one time conferred power on the Commonwealth to 
pass legislation with respect to "external affairs and treaties."'M These references 
to treaties were both omitted at a later stage, apparently in the belief that they 
would encroach upon the right of the Imperial government to make treaties on 
behalf of the self~governing Dominions of the Empire, and also because of a 
misunderstanding concerning the difference between treaty-making and treaty 
implementation. '9 Even if these provisions had not been omitted, the power of 
the Imperial government to enter into treaties binding Australia could have been 
preserved while retaining the practice of adopting self-executing treaties as 
domestic law without the need for implementing legislation. 
As a result, the Constitution remained silent both on the question of whether 
the federal government could enter into treaties and on the effect of treaties in 
domestic law. The position subsequently adopted by the courts reflects the 
settled view in many of the nations which inherited the English position: al-
though customary international law may form part of the common law to the 
extent that it is not inconsistent with statute or judicial decision,tO treaties affect-
15. The Australian Constitution was established by the United Kingdom's Commonwealth of Au-
stralia Constitution Act, 1900,63 & 64 Viet., ch. 12. For the text of the Constitution, see id. § 9. The nine 
sections of the U.K. Act are referred to as the covering clauses of the Constitution. 
16. See U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. 
17. OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINCS AND DEBATES OF THE NATIONAL AUSTRALASIAN CONVEN-
TION, held in Parliament House, Sydney, New South Wales, in March and April 1891, at CXXIV (1891) 
[hereinafter cited as OFFICIAL RECORD 1891), cited in Thomson, supra note 14, at 120 (wilh full texl of 
original form of covering clause 5). 
18. OFFICIAL RECORD 1891, supra note 17, at CXXXIX, cited in Thomson, supra note 14, at 123-24. 
19. See, e.g., Thomson, supra note 14, at 122. The position in the United Kingdom al the time was that 
when the Crown entered into a treaty with anolher nation in the exercise of the Crown prerogative in 
relation to foreign affairs, the terms of the treaty did not thereby become part of the domestic law of Ihe 
United Kingdom. Only after the lreaty had been adopted by legislative enactment was it enforceable as 
domestic law. 
20. See Chung Chi Cheung v. R, (1939) A.C. 160. 
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ing the rights and duties of subjects do not become part of the law of the land 
until adopted by an authoritative legislative act. 21 While statutes are to be con-
strued where possible to conform with international law, a statute contrary to 
international law has primacy in the Australian domestic legal system if a conflict 
is unavoidable. 22 
C. Au,\tmlia's Emergence al a Nation Internationally and Nationally 
While as a matter of both domestic and international law the establishment of 
the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 did not create a new member of the 
international community, events between 1901 and 194:! did result in Australia 
achieving full international status.n This change in status reflected the recogni-
tion within the British Empire of the autonomy and independence of the various 
Dominions. The first major entry of Australia and the other Dominions into the 
international arena as independent nations was the Treaty of Versailles, which 
was signed by the British delegate on behalf of the British Empire, as well as by 
each of the Dominion governments. The Balfour Declaration, approved at the 
Imperial Conference of 1926, formally recognized the autonomy of the Domin-
ions. This status was given statutory recognition in the Statute of Westminster 
1931 (U.KV· 
Judicial and executive interpretation of the constitutjonal allocation of power 
in respect of foreign affairs has naturally been influenced by these historical 
developments. After Australia began to undertake international obligations in its 
own right, the transfer in political power from the United Kingdom to Australia 
was reflected in the legal relocation of the Crown prerogative in respect of 
foreign affairs from the Crown in right of the United Kingdom (acting upon the 
advice of British Ministers)2.; to the Crown in right of Australia (the Governor-
21. Bradley v. Commonwealth, (1972) 128 C.L.R. 557, 582-83; Chow Hung Ching v. R, (1948) 77 
C.L.R. 449 ; Polites v, Commonwealth, (1945) 70 c'L.R. 60; Attorney-General (Canada) v. Attorney-
General (Ontario), [1937] A,C, 326; Walker v. Baird, [1892] A.C. 491. 
22, See supra note 21. 
23, See lieuerally Lewis, The International Status of the BritLlh SelFlioverning Dommions, 3 BRIT. V,B. ".;T·L 
L. 21 (1922-23); lines, The Growth of Australian Nationhood and its Effects on the Powers of the Commonwealth, 
in COMMENTARIES ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION I-50 (L. lines ed. 1977); O'Connell & Crawford, 
The EvolutIOn of Australia's International Personality, in INTERNATIO"AL LAW IN AUSTRALIA (K.W. Ryan 2d 
ed. 1984) 1-34. 
24. See lienerally O'Connell & Crawford, wpra note 23, at 17-21; lines, supra note 23, at 25-30; Scott, 
The Britilh Commonweal1h of Nations, 21 AM. J. INT'L L. 99 (1927)(editorial comment); I. BERNIER, 
INTERNATIO"AL LE(;AL ASPECTS OF FEDERALISM 68 (1973). 
25. In a Westminster system ot government, the expression "the Crown" reters to the monarch as the 
titular embodiment of the executive government. According to established constitutional conventions, 
the monarch acts on the advice ot his or her Ministers ot State, who are members of, and therefore 
responsible to the elected Parliament. The British monarch is both the formal embodiment ot the 
executive government ot the United Kingdom as well as the executive government of Australia. The 
expression "Crown in right ot the United Kingdom" thus means the executive government of the 
Cnited Kingdom (in constitutional theory the Queen aCling on the advice of her British Ministers) and 
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General of Australia acting upon advice of Australian Ministers).26 The political 
exclusion of the Australian states from the conduct of foreign affairs was 
reflected in the exclusive vesting of the foreign affairs prerogative in the Crown 
in right of the Commonwealth. Today it is generally accepted that the states have 
no international personality and no capacity to enter into international treaties. 27 
Nonetheless, it has taken from the the inception of the Commonwealth in 1901 
until the High Coun's decision in the Tasmanian Dam5 2H case in 1983 for there to 
emerge a definitive statement of the Commonwealth's power to implement 
domestically its international treaty obligations. 
The gradual expansion in the scope of t he external affairs power reflects bot h 
the gradual expansion of federal powers in other areas since the Second World 
War, as well as the High Court's narrow construction of a number of other heads 
of federal legislative power. The prime example of this has been the power to 
legislate with respect to interstate trade and commerce. In interpreting this 
power, the High Court has refused to follow U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
on the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court 
having construed that clause so broadly that it subsumes practically all other 
heads of federal legislative power.2~ The High Court's decisions have been 
considerably narrower in construing the corresponding commerce power of the 
Australian Constitution. 30 As a result, the federal government has been obliged 
to rely upon whatever other powers were available to it. Recently, in many areas, 
the external affairs power seemed to be the most suitable candidate. On the 
whole, it has been the less conservative governments which have sought to make 
extensive use of the power, partly because of their commitment to implementing 
various economic and social policies on a national scale, and partly because of 
their commitment to achieve acceptable standards of human rights in Australia. 
the expression "Crown in right of the Commonwealth [of Australia] or of the states" means the 
executive government of the Commonwealth or of the states. In Australian context, the Queen is 
represented by the Governor-General at the Commonwealth level and by Governors at the state level. 
who act on the advice of federal and state Ministers respectively. See O. HOOD PHt!.I.IP·S CONSTlTl!-
TlO>lAL A"D ADMtNtSTRATlVE lAW, supra note 3, at 697-99. 
26. See Barton v. Commonwealth, (1974) 31 C.L.R. 477, 498-99 (Mason,.J.); O'Connell & Crawford, 
supra note 23, at 27-28. A similar development took place in Canada. Forest, The Lahour Conventions Case 
Revisited, 12 CAN. V.B. INT'!. L. 137, 138 (1974). 
27. Burmester, The Australian States and Part1C2pation in the Foreign Policy Process, 9 FED. L. REV. 257 
(1978). This is not to say that the states do not assert some limited competence in concluding informal 
agreements with foreign nations (primarily in the areas of trade and cultural exchanges), and in sending 
trade representatives to other countries.ld. at 272-74. The position in Canada is similar, although the 
extent of Canadian provincial international activities is probably g-reater than in Australia. 
28. Commonwealth v. Tasmania, (1983) 57 Aust!. L.J.R. 450; (1983) 46 Aust!' L.R. 625. 
29. See L. TRtBE, AMERtCAN CO>lSTlTUTtO>lAl. LAW 232-39 (1978). 
30. See L. Zt"ES, THE HI(;H COURT AND THE CONSTITI)TIOl\ 37-58 (1981). See, e.g., Airlines of New 
South Wales v. New South Wales (No.2), (1965) 113 C.L.R. 54, 77-78,113-15,144, 149; Grannall v. 
Marrickville Margarine Pty. Ltd., (1955) 93 C.L.R. 55, 77. 
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Ill. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS POWER: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Early Years: (1901-36) 
The limited nature of the Australian government's participation in the inter-
national arena in the first quarter of the twentieth century meant that federal 
legislation in the area of external affairs was primarily concerned with the 
implementation of treaty obligations by which Australia had become bound as a 
member of the British Empire. The little judicial commentary on the power was 
primarily in this context. 31 Not until 1936 was it necessary for the High Court to 
consider the validity of a federal law based solely upon the external affairs 
power. Nonetheless, prior to 1936 some members of the Court thought that the 
external affairs power would encompass legislation on various matters, includ-
ing: the extradition of fugitive offenders;32 the implementation of provisions of 
the Treaty of Peace (1919) relating to the vesting of German property to pay 
debts and reparations;33 the acceptance and administration by Australia of New 
Guinea as a Class C mandate under the League of Nations system;34 and the 
deportation of Pacific Islanders.35 In each of these cases, however, a decision on 
the extent of the external affairs power was not necessary, as another clear 
source of power was available in each instance. 
B. The Burgess Case (1936) 
The first important case involving the external affairs power was R. v. Burgess 
ex parte Henry.36 Henry had been convicted of failure to comply with certain 
federal regulations made pursuant to section 4 of the Air Navigation Act 1920 
(Clh).37 Section 4 authorized the making of such regulations as were necessary to 
give effect to the 1919 Paris Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Naviga-
tion,38 to which Australia was a party. Although the High Court quashed Henry's 
conviction on the ground that the regulations did not in fact conform to the 
terms of the Convention, all members of the Court upheld the power of the 
31. See cases cited infra notes 32-35. 
32. See McKelvey v. Meagher, (1906) 4 C.L.R. 265, 279. 
33. See Roche v. Kronheimer, (1921) 29 C.L.R. 329, 338 (Higgins,]., who also thought that the law in 
question could be upheld under the defense power). Accord R. v. Burgess, (1936) 55 C.L.R. 608,641 
(Latham, C.J.). 
34. See Jolley v. Mainka, (1933) 49 C.L.R. 242, 249-50 (Starke,j.), 286 (Evatt,j.); Ffrost v. Stevenson, 
(1937) 58 C.L.R. 528,557 (Latham, C.].), 595-96 (Evatt,].) (other judges placed the assertion of power 
as firmly rooted in the power to legislate for the peace, order, and good government of territories 
acquired by the Commonwealth. See AUSTL. CONST. § 122. 
35. See Robtelmes v. Brenan, (1906) 4 C.L.R. 395. 
36. (1936) 55 C.L.R. 608. 
37. Air Navigation Act 1920 (Cth). 
38. Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, signed at Paris, October 13, 1919, 11 
L.N.T.S. 174. 
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Commonwealth to implement the Convention under section 51(29) of the Con-
stitution.39 Three members of the Court took a very broad view of the power. 
Justices Evatt and McTiernan believed that the power clearly extended to the 
implementation of treaties entered into by the Commonwealth and were pre-
pared to extend it to implement recommendations of international organizations 
such as the International Labour Organisation, which were not formally binding 
on Australia. 40 Chief Justice Latham considered the power to be sufficient for the 
Commonwealth to implement all treaties into which it entered.41 All three of 
these judges noted the wide range of topics that had formed the subject of 
international agreement, and denied that there was any subject matter that was 
not capable of becoming the basis of an international agreement. 42 
The remaining two members of the High Court were somewhat more cautious 
about the scope of the external affairs power, although they agreed that the 
subject of air navigation as regulated by the Convention was encompassed by the 
power. 
Mr. Justice Dixon, for example, sounded a note of caution in a passage which 
was later seized upon by judges anxious to restrict the broad statements by the 
other members of the Burgess Court: 
[I]t it seems an extreme view that merely because the Executive 
Government undertakes with some other country that the conduct 
of persons in Australia shall be regulated in a particular way, the 
legislature thereby obtains power to enact that regulation although it 
relates to a matter of internal concern which, apart from the obliga-
tion undertaken by the Executive, could not be considered a matter 
of external affairs. 43 
Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Dixon considered air navigation to be a subject possess-
ing an international character because of the issues of mutual recognition of 
sovereignty over airspace and the practical advantage of securing uniformity in 
the case of the airplane that "defie[d] territorial boundaries."44 
The next significant case following Burgess also involved air navigation. In 
Airlines of New Suuth Wales v. New South Wales (No. 2),45 the plaintiff, Airlines of 
New South Wales, sought a declaration that its activities were not subject to 
statutes passed by the State of New South Wales regulating intrastate air naviga-
tion. It argued that the state legislation was inconsistent with federal regulations 
39. The regulations were subsequently upheld in an amended form in the face of another challenge 
by Henry in R. v. Poole ex parte Henry, (1939) 61 C.L.R. 634. 
40. Burgess. 55 C.L.R. at 687. 
41. Id. at 644. 
42. Id. at 640-42. 680. 
43. Id. at 669. 
44. Id. at 669. Mr. Justice Starke concurred. Id. at 658. 
45. (1964) 113 C.L.R. 54. 
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made pursuant to the Air Navigation Act of 1920 (Cth), which purported to 
implement 'the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation.46 A 
majority of the Court upheld the federal regulations under the external affairs 
power, and all but. one member of the Court were prepared to uphold them 
under the trade and commerce power. The only significant statement about the 
scope of the external affairs power was made by Chief Justice Barwick: 
I find no need in this case for any general discussion of the external 
affairs power .... Suffice it now to say that in my opinion the 
Chicago Convention, having regard to its subject matter, the manner 
of its formation, the extent of international participation in it and the 
nature of the obligations it imposes upon the parties to it unques-
tionably is, or, at any rate, brings into existence, an external affair of 
Australia ... I would not wish to be thought to say that all these 
features must in every case be present if a treaty or convention is to 
attract the external affairs power, but I would wish to be understood 
as indicating that in my opinion, as at present advised, the mere fact 
that the Commonwealth has subscribed to some international docu-
ment does not necessarily attract any power to the Commonwealth 
Parliament .47 
C. The Seas and Submerged Lands Case (1975) 
The next major case construing the external affairs power concerned the 
Commonwealth's attempt to implement the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the 
Continental Shelf48 and on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.49 In New 
South Wales v. Commonwealth,"o all six states of the Commonwealth challenged the 
Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth),31 which declared that sovereignty 
over the territorial sea and continental shelf was vested in and exercisable by the 
Crown in right of the Commonwealth.52 A unanimous Court upheld the provi-
sions of the Act relating to the continental shelf on the ground that the Act 
secured to Australia only those benefits guaranteed by the Continental Shelf 
Convention. 53 Three judges upheld the provisions of the Act because they also 
46. Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944,61 Stat. 
1180, T.l.A.S. No. 1591. 
47. (1964) 113 C.L.R. 54, 85. 
48. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva Apr. 29, 1958 (entry into force June 10, 
1964),15 U.S.T. 471, T.l.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. 
49. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva Apr. 29, 1958, (entry 
into force, Sept. 10, 1964), 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.l.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205. 
50. (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337. 
51. Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth). 
52. /d. at §§ 6, I!. 
53. (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337, 360-64 (Barwick, C.j.), 375-78 (McTiernan,].), 415-16 (Gibbs,].), 456-58 
(Stephen,].), 472-76 (Mason,].), 497-98 Oacobs, j.), 502-03 (Murphy, j.). 
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related to things geographically external to Australia. 54 Additionally, a majority 
of the Court upheld the provisions of the Act vesting sovereign rights in the 
territorial sea and its subsoil in the Commonwealth on the ground that the 
provisions gave effect to the Territorial Sea Convention. 55 
The disagreement between the majority and the minority on the validity of the 
provisions relating to t he territorial sea arose out of their views as to whether the 
states possessed any rights to the territorial sea and its subsoil as a matter of 
domestic law. 56 The majority held that the states had no such rights;57 the 
minority disagreed:;H and argued that the Territorial Sea Convention only af-
fected the sovereignty of the Commonwealth vis-a-vis other nations and there-
fore, it could not be read as intending an internal redistribution of rights 
between the constituent units of a federal nation.59 Accordingly, because the 
Convention neither contemplated nor authorized the divestiture of the states' 
rights in the territorial sea in favor of the Commonwealth, the minority refused 
to uphold the Act as a lawful measure to implement the Convention. 60 Had the 
majority found that the Act. operated to divest the states of territorial rights in 
favor of the Commonwealth, the Act would probably have been struck down on 
the ground that entry into a treaty may not be used as the legal basis for 
depriving the states of part of their territory.6! 
Even after the Seas and Submerged Lands case, the scope of the external affairs 
power was far from definitive. Although the cases which had upheld federal 
regulation of intrastate air navigation on the basis of international conventions 
had made inroads into areas that had traditionally been regulated by the states, 
an expansion of Commonwealth power into at least some areas of state power 
54. See id. at 360 (Barwick, c.j.), 470 (Mason, j.), 497 (Jacobs, ].). Mr. Justice Murphy's views also 
extend this far. See id. at 502·04. 
55.Id. at 361 (Barwick, C-J.), 376·77 (McTiernan, ].),474-75 (Mason, ].),503-04 (Murphy, ].). 
56. The Australian federaVstate battle over offshore resources was similar to experiences in the 
United States and Canada. In each nation's battle, the federal government was victorious. In the 
Australian battle, the High Court relied at least in part on the following North American authorities: Re 
Ownership of Offshore Mineral Rights, (1967) 65 D.L.R. (2d) 353; United States v. California, 332 U.S. 
19 (1947); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975). 
57. (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337, 368-70 (Barwick, C-J.), 378 (McTiernan,j.), 459-68 (Mason,].), 480-95 
(Jacobs, j.), 504-06 (Murphy, j.). 
58. [d. at 391·414 (Gibbs, j.), 417·43 (Stephen, j.). 
59. (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337, 385 (Gibbs, j.), 451·54 (Stephen,J.). Similar criticisms have been made of 
the judgment of the Canadian Supreme Court in the Offshore Mineral Rights case, 65 D.L.R. (2d) at 376, 
380. McWhinney, Canadian Federalism and the Foreign Affairs and Treaty Power: The Impact of Quebec's 'Quiet 
Revolution' 7 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 3, 17-20 (1969). 
60. (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337, 390-91 (Gibbs, j.), 453-54 (Stephen, J.). Mr. Justice Stephen, one of the 
minority on the territorial sea issue, did consider that in relation to the right of innocent passage which a 
coastal state was required to guarantee to the vessels of foreign nations, the Commonwealth could pass 
overriding legislation in order to discharge effectively this obligation. Id. at 454-55. Interestingly 
enough, none of the majority considered that the failure of the Act to implement the provisions of the 
Territorial Sea Convention relating to innocent passage in any way meant that the Act could not be 
considered to implement the Convention. 
61. See (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337,476 (Mason, j.), 480 (Jacobs, ].). 
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had to be expected if the external afbirs power was to be given any meaningful 
content at all. The federal regulation of air navigation, which involved tangible 
international links, could be viewed as a reasonable subject for Commonwealth 
regulation under section 51(29), particularly because it did not seem to open up 
the whole range of state legislative activity to federal preemption. 
In the cases not involving air navigation decided through 1975, little or 
virtually no competition between federal and state legislative power was in-
volved. In the Seas and Submerged Lands case, a number of members of the 
majority pointed out that in light of their conclusion that the states possessed no 
rights in the territorial sea, there could be no question of inroads being made 
into state legislative power: the federal and state governments were not in 
competition beyond the low-water mark.62 Other references to the scope of the 
external affairs power had involved some sort of foreign connection, whether it 
was the treatment of a fugitive offender from another country ,63 the deportation 
of an alien,s4 or the possibility of harm to Australia's foreign relations arising out 
of subversive activities in Australia. 65 In addition, in all these cases there was at 
least one other plausible and uncontroversial head of power, aside from the 
external affairs power, upon which the legislation could have been based. 66 
IV. THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS POWER: RECENT DECISIONS 
None of the cases before 1975 raised in an acute form the problems that a 
broad construct jon of the external affairs power would pose for the detailed 
allocation of responsibilities between Commonwealth and States as prescribed by 
the Constitution. Perhaps the most difficult and significant question in this 
context was whether the mere fact of entry into a treaty gave the federal 
government the power to pass implementing legislation notwithstanding the fact 
that the legislation applied only to nationals of the country in relation to their 
activities within that country, or whether the treaty had to deal with a "matter of 
international concern."H7 
Those supporting a broad construction of the external affairs power have 
argued that, because the federal government both represents the nation in the 
international sphere and enters into binding obligations internationally, it is 
logical and appropriate that the federal government have the power to fulfill 
62. A similar analysis applies to those cases dealing with the federal government's power in relation 
to Papua-New Guinea (see supra note 34) and seems to have been adopted by the High Court in Fishwick 
v. Cleland, (1960) 106 C.L.R. 186. See also Zines, The Australian Constitution 1951-1976,7 FED. L. REV. 89, 
101-02 (1976). 
63. McKelvey v. Meagher, (1906) 4 c.L.R. 265; Ffrost v. Stevenson, (1937) 58 C.L.R. 528. 
64. Robtelmes v. Brenan, (1906) 4 C.L.R. 395. 
65. R. v. Sharkey, (1949) 79 C.L.R. 121. 
66. See, e.g., Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, (1982) 56 Aust!. L.j.R. 625, 658 (Wilson, j.). 
67. [d. at 645 (Stephen, j.). 
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those obligations domestically. Mr.Justice Murphy took this approach in the Seas 
and Submerged Lands case: 
The Constitution, particularly section 51(xxix) is intended to enable 
Australia to carry out its functions as an international person, fulfil-
ling its international obligations and acting effectively as a member 
of the community of nations. If not, Australia would be an interna-
tional cripple unable to participate fully in the emerging world 
order. 6" 
A subsidiary argument is the historical argument that, in the past, it was difficult 
or impossible to get all states to agree to the implementation of many treaties and 
that, consequently, the best or even only solution is to confer paramount author-
ity on the federal government.69 In those federations where the upper house of a 
bicameral legislature is theoretically a states' house, the argument may also be 
advanced that the states already participate in the treaty implementation process 
when the upper house considers the legislation designed to implement the 
provisions of the treaty. Such an argument tends to be somewhat unconvincing 
in those countries in which the upper house has given up all pretense of actually 
representing the states rather than being organized on party lines. 70 
Those arguing for a more restrictive view of the external affairs power point 
out that, while international law does indeed impose obligations on the central 
government and does not accept a plea of internal constitutional arrangements 
to excuse its failure to carry out the nation's international obligations, interna-
tional law does not attempt to redistribute the powers already allocated among 
the various governments in a federation. Moreover, in many cases there is 
nothing to prevent many international obligations from being performed at the 
state level (which indeed may be preferable in many cases), and therefore a 
cooperative approach to the implementation of treaties is desirable and possi-
ble. 71 
The major thrust of the restrictive argument is, however, based upon the fear 
that, if one permits the mere existence of a treaty to give rise to greater legislative 
power in the central authority, there may be no limit to the expansion of that 
68. (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337, 503. 
69. See, e.g., Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 56 Austl. L.J.R. 625, 649 (Mason, J.), and the 
discussion infra section 1 V. 
70. Cf I. BERNIER, supra note 24, at 26; (Federal Republic of Germany, where the members of the 
Linder government and all members from one Land must vote in a bloc). See generally Sharman, The 
Australian Senate as a States House, in THE POLITICS OF NEW FEDERALISM 64-75 (D. Jaensch ed. 1977) for a 
discussion of the role of the Senate. 
71. Attorney-General (Canada) v. Attorney-General (Ontario), [1937] A.C. 326, 348; N.S.W. v. 
Commonwealth, (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337,445 (Stephen, J.). Cf Article 16 of the Austrian Constitution, 
which imposes an obligation on the provinces to take such measures as are necessary for the implemen-
tation of treaties dealing with subjects within their competence. Hthey fail to do so, "the competence to 
enact the necessary legislation passes to the federation." I. BERNIER, supra note 24, at 98. 
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power into virtually every area of nationallife. 72 Thus, to allow such an expan-
sion would destroy the basis of the federal compact, which is predicated on a 
careful distribution of specified powers. As Chief Justice Gibbs stated in Koowarta 
v. Bjelke-Petersen: 
In other words, if [section 51(29)] empowers the Parliament to legis-
late to give effect to every international agreement which the execu-
tive may choose to make, the Commonwealth would be able to 
acquire unlimited legislative power. The distribution of powers 
made by the Constitution could in time be completely obliterated; 
there would be no field of power which the Commonwealth could 
not invade, and the federal balance achieved by the Constitution 
could be entirely destroyed. 73 
A. The Racial Discrimination Case: Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen 
The question of whether there were any matters which were "purely domestic" 
and thus immune from the reach of the federal government under the external 
affairs power presented itself in the form of a challenge to federal legislation 
implementing the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination 1966.74 In Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen,75 a group of 
Aborigines living in Queensland 76 sought to gain the benefit of a pastoral lease by 
requesting the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission to purchase the lease for use 
by them for grazing purposes. Such a transaction required the consent of the 
Queensland Minister for Lands. However, when his consent was requested, the 
Minister refused to grant it on the ground that to do so would not be in 
72. This is combined with the fear that entry into treaties could be used as a colorable device by the 
federal government to arrogate power to itself. Interestingly enough, the Canadian Royal Commission 
on Dominion-Provincial Relations that followed the Labour Conventions case recommended the granting 
of power to the federal government to implement LL.O. conventions, as the manner of their formation 
was such that they could not be exploited as merely colorable devices to attract power. See Sorensen, 
Federal States and the International Protection of Human Rights, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 195,201 (1952). 
73. (1982) 56 Aust!' L.J.R. 625, 637 (Gibbs, C.J.). 
74. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966,660 
U.N.T.S.195. 
75. (1982) 56 Aust!. L.J.R. 625; 39 Aust!. L.R. 417. Koowarta has been commented on in a number of 
law review notes, primarily from the perspective of Australian constitutional law, with little reference to 
its international significance. See, e.g., Finnis, The Power to Enforce Treaties in Australia - the High Court goes 
Centralist?, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 126 (1983); Note, 13 FED. L. REV. 360 (1983); Note, 13 MELB. U.L. 
REV. 635 (1982); Note, 56 Amt!. L.J. 519 (1982); Crock, Federalism and the External Affairs Power, 14 
MELB. U.L. REV. 238, 252-56 (1983); H. Charlesworth, Federal States and the International Protection oj 
Human Rights, 79-83 (1983) (unpublished LL.M. paper, Harvard Law School); Sawer, The External 
Affairs Power of the Commonwealth and Koowarta's Case, 54 AUSTL. Q. 428-34 (1982). 
76. Queensland is a state with an historically poor record in its treatment of Aborigines. For a select 
bibliography of Aboriginal history, see the judgment of Murphy, J. in Koowarta, (1982) 56 Aust!. L.J.R. 
625, 656-57. 
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accordance with Queensland Government policy, as the Cabinet did not favor 
the acquisition of large areas of land by Aborigines or Aboriginal groUpS.77 
Koowarta, a member of the Aboriginal grou p seeking to gain the benefit of the 
lease, brought an action against the Premier and Minister for Lands of Queens-
land, alleging that the refusal to agree to the transfer was in violation of sections 
9 and 12 of the federal Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). Subsection 9(1) of 
that Act provided: 
9(1) It is unlawful for a person to do any act involving a distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race ... which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoy-
ment or exercise, on an equal footing, of any human right or fun-
damental freedom. 
Subsection 9(2) defined a "human right or fundamental freedom" as including 
rights referred to in Article 5 of the Convention, which referred to a number of 
rights including "the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others."7s 
Subsection 12(1) of the Act provided: 
12(1) it is unlawful for a person, whether as a principal or agent-
(a) to refuse or fail to dispose of any estate or interest in land or 
any residential or business accommodation to a second person ... 
(d) to refuse to permit a second person to occupy any land or any 
residential or business accommodation, ... by reason of the race, 
colour or national or ethnic origin of that second person or of any 
relative or associate of that second person. 
All members of the Court accepted that the provisions of the Act challenged by 
Koowarta implemented the relevant provisions of the Convention. The question 
was whether the topic of racial discrimination, as dealt with by the Convention, 
was part of the nation's external affairs. 
Three judges (out of a majority of four) who upheld the Act took the view that 
a treaty obligation forms part of the nation's external affairs almost by de fin i-
tion. 79 Only if it could be shown that the treaty had been entered into mala fide, 
with the sole purpose of attracting further legislative power to the Common-
wealth, would any doubt arise; such a case was difficult to imagine. so These three 
members of the court held that any treaty between Australia and another 
country is unequivocal evidence that the subject matter of the treaty is of 
international concern. S! Central to this view was the acceptance of the changing 
77. (1982) 56 Austl. L.J.R. 625, 627 (Gibbs, C.].). 
78. 660 U.N .T.S. 195, 220-21. 
79. (1982) 56 Austl. LJ.R. 625, 651 (Mason, J.), 656 (Murphy, J.), 664 (Brennan, J.). 
80. [d. at 651 (Mason, J.), 664 (Brennan, J.). 
81. [d. at 648 (Mason,].), 656 (Murphy, J.), 664 (Brennan, J.). 
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nature of the international community and the difficulty of maintaining that 
there are some matters which are purely domestic and not subjects of genuine 
international concern. 
The other majority judge, Mr. Justice Stephen, taking a slightly less broad 
view, stated: 
It will not be enough that the challenged law gives effect to treaty 
obligations. A treaty with another country, whether or not the result 
of a collusive arrangement, which is on a topic neither of especial 
concern to the relationship between Australia and that other country 
nor of general international concern will not be likely to survive 
[scrutin y ].H2 
Mr. Justice Stephen considered that international concern over racial discrimina-
tion dearly satisfied this additional criterion of "general international concern."83 
The minority opinions were heavily influenced by the desire to ensure that the 
federal government not be permitted to expand its powers limitlessly by entering 
into treaties, no matter how genuine those treaties might be.84 Accordingly, an 
attempt was made, based on previous cases, to draw a distinction between purely 
domestic affairs, actions within Australia involving only citizens, and external 
affairs, involving other countries, foreigners, or persons or things outside of 
Australia.85 The minority viewed the Act as a law regulating domestic matters 
and not one relating to external affairs.86 
Having decided that previous authority did not support the Commonwealth's 
argument in favor of a power to implement treaties without regard to their 
subject matter and being of the view that acceptance of this argument would 
entail the destruction of the federal balance,87 the minority in Koowarta had to 
deal with the argument that customary international law imposed an obligation 
on Australia to eliminate racial discrimination within its borders.88 The federal 
nature of the Constitution once again did service here, since the appropriate 
method of fulfilling international obligations dealing with "domestic" matters 
was argued to be through cooperation between the states and the federal gov-
ernment.89 The minority, however, failed to recognize an important difference 
between a nation's assumption of a treaty obligation and the development of a 
82. Id. at 645. 
83. Id. at 646-47. 
84. Id. at 637-39 (Gibbs, C.].); 659-61 (Wilson, j.). Mr. Justice Aickin concurred in the judgment of 
Chief Justice Gibbs. Id. at 657. 
85. Id. at 638-39 (Gibbs, C.] .), 658-59 (Wilson, j.). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 638, 658. 
88. The external affairs power clearly extends to some customary international law obligations. L. 
ZINES, supra note 30, at 230-34. 
89. (1982) 56 Austl. L.j.R. 625, 634 (Gibbs, C.j.), 660 (Wilson, j.). 
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norm of customary international law: the genesis of a rule of customary interna-
tional law may not be as easily manipulated as they assumed treaty obligations. 
Under the minority's approach, Australia could be hamstrung - bound by a 
norm of customary international law, yet unable either to secure the cooperation 
of the states or to fulfill the obligation itself. 
More extreme, however, was Chief Justice Gibbs' opinion. Recognizing that 
racial discrimination was a subject of major international concern, and noting the 
existence of certain customary international law obligations to prevent it, the 
Chief Justice asserted that the scope of those obligations did not include the 
prohibition of the type of action involved in the present case: 
It can readily be understood that international law should treat a 
violation of human rights as not merely a matter of domestic jurisdic-
tion, but as a breach of international obligation, if the violation 
"threatens the international peace and security" ... or if there are 
"gross violations or consistent patterns of violations" .... Genocide, 
torture, imprisonment without trials, and wholesale deprivations of 
the right to vote, to work or to be educated provide examples of 
violations of that kind. The act of discrimination alleged in the 
present case - the exercise, in a discriminatory way, of a discretio-
nary power to refuse consent to the transfer of a Crown lease -
stands on an entirely different plane. It could not in my opinion be 
said that the refusal of the Minister to grant this consent was a gross 
violation of a human right or fundamental freedom.90 
Not only does Chief Justice Gibbs' opinion manifest a highly distorted reading 
of the development of international law, but it also ignores the fact that in the 
Convention (which clearly has had an impact on the development of customary 
law in the area) a large number of nations specifically attacked the sort of 
conduct involved in Koowarta. It further ignores the correlation between al-
legedly "minor" incidents of racial discrimination and the ideology of racial 
superiority, as well as the effect that such incidents have on relations between 
nations. The opinion also demonstrates an almost complete insensitivity to the 
issue of racial piscrimination, as it trivializes an incident which involved the 
application of a government policy in a state notorious for its gross and consis-
tent discrimination against Aborigines.91 
90. Id. at 640. 
91. The unsuccessful attempts of the federal government to persuade the Queensland government 
to repeal certain laws discriminating against Aborigines, which led to the enactment of the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islanders (Queensland Discriminatory Laws) Act 1975 (Cth), demonstrates the 
attitude of the Queensland government. 92 AUSTL. PARL. DEB., H.R., 42 (1974). See generally G. 
NETTHEIM, VICTIMS OF THE LAW: BLACK QUEENSLANDERS TODAY (1981); HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, 
ANNUAL REPORT 1981-82, VOLUME 2, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER FOR COMMUNITY RELATIONS 3, 
24-28 (1982)(Parliamentary Paper No. 444, 1982). 
The discriminatory policies of the Queensland government have given rise to criticism of Australia 
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The majority in Koowarta adopted a more plausible interpretation of the 
attention given to government-endorsed acts of racial discrimination: 
[It seems] that the community of nations, or at least a very large 
number of them, are vigorously opposed to racial discrimination, not 
only on idealistic and humanitarian grounds, but also because racial 
discrimination is generally considered to be inimical to friendly and 
peaceful relations among nations and is a threat to peace and secu-
rity among peoples ... the failure of a party to fulfill its obligations 
[under the Convention] becomes a matter of international discus-
sion, disapproval and perhaps action by way of enforcement. 92 
The result of the Koowarta case was to uphold the validity of the Racial 
Discrimination Act and to affirm the power of the federal government to imple-
ment at least some treaties dealing with "purely domestic" matters. The split in 
the Court and the approach taken by Mr. Justice Stephen, however, still left 
open the question of whether the federal government had the power to imple-
ment all treaties irrespective of whether the subject matter of any particular 
treaty could be viewed as a topic of "general international concern"93 or as 
"indisputably international in character."94 
B. The Tasmanian Dams Case 
The question concerning the scope of the federal government's external 
affairs power was resolved in favor of the Commonwealth in Commonwealth v. 
Tasmania (the Tasmanian Dams case).95 The case arose out of a major political 
dispute between the federal and Tasmanian governments over the construction 
of a dam and a .hydroelectric power station on the Gordon River below its 
junction with the Franklin River in southwest Tasmania. The Tasmanian gov-
internationally. See, e.g., Burgmann, Aborigines: The Struggle Continues, in THE PIECES OF POLITICS 308-09 
(R. Lucy 3d ed. 1983). A critical report prepared by a team from the World Council of Churches has 
aroused much international attention and has been widely circulated among United Nations bodies. See 
E. ADLER, JUSTICE FOR ABORICINAL AUSTRALIANS: REPORT OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES TEAM 
VISIT TO THE ABORI(;[NES (1981). 
92. (1982) 56 Aust!. LJ.R. 625, 653 (Mason, j.). See also id. at 646-47, 655, 664. 
93. Id. at 645 (Stephen, j.). 
94. R. v. Burgess ex parte Henry, (1936) 55 C.L.R. 608, 669 (Dixon, ].). 
95. (1983) 57 Aust!. L.].R. 450; 46 Aust!' L.R. 625 (Mason, Murphy, Brennan, and DeaneJ].; Gibbs, 
C.]., Wilson, and Dawson J]., dissenting). The background to the case and the relevant legislation are 
summarized by Chief Justice Gibbs. See id. at 456-69. The case has been the subject of comment in a 
number of journals and books. See, e.g., M. COPER, THE FRANKLIN DAM CASE 1-26 (1983); Connolly, The 
Tasmanian Dam Case: Treaties and the Australian Constitution, 54 AUSTL. FOREIGN AFF. REC. 756-58 Quly 
1983); Lane, The Federal Parliament's External Affairs Power: The Tasmanian Dams Case, 57 AUSTI .. LJ. 554 
(1983); Howard, External Affairs Power of the Commonwealth, CURRENT AFF. BULL. 16 (Sept. 1983); 
Walker, A Legal Wilderness Preserved, LAW INSTITUTE JOURNAL 307 Quly 1983); Crock, Federalism and the 
External Affairs Power, 14 MELB. U.L. REV. 238, 256-63; Connell, External Affairs Power and the Domestic 
Implementation of Treaties, 55 AUSTL. FORE[(;N AFF. REC. 492 (Sept. 1983); THE SOUTH WEST DAM 
DISPUTE: THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES (M. Sornarajah ed. 1983). 
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ernment favored construction of the dam because it considered the resulting 
increased capacity to generate large amounts of electricity essential to economic 
growth and the creation of employment opportunities in Tasmania's ailing 
economy. In March 1983, a new federal Labor government, which had commit-
ted itself to stopping the construction of the dam, came to power. This new 
federal government believed that construction of the dam would result in the 
flooding of significant Aboriginal archaeological sites, as well as damaging a 
wilderness area of outstanding natural significance.96 
The Commonwealth government promulgated regulations under the Na-
tional Parks and Wildlife Act 1975 (Cth),97 and subsequently enacted the World 
Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth), under which regulations were 
also made. The World Heritage Properties Conservation Act and regulations 
were intended to stop construction of the dam and any preparatory or associated 
works by prohibiting a wide range of activities within designated areas98 (broadly, 
the dam site, the Franklin River valley and various areas containing archaeologi-
cal sites). 
Because the Commonwealth possessed no specific power to legislate with 
respect to the environment or the preservation of the national or world cultural 
heritage within its territory, it sought to justify the legislation by reference to 
various powers, including: the power to legislate with respect to external af-
fairs;99 the power to legislate with respect to the people of any race for whom the 
Parliament deems it necessary to make special laws; 100 the power to legislate with 
respect to trading corporations;lol and the power to legislate arising from the 
national nature of the government in respect of matters particularly appropriate 
to be regulated at the national level.102 
The Court split as to which particular sections of the Act and regulations were 
valid, but in the end sufficient legislation survived to prevent the Tasmanian 
96. The area that would have been affected by the construction had been placed on the World 
Heritage List, which was maintained pursuant to the provisions of the UNESCO Convention for the 
Protection and Preservation of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972,27 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. 
No. 8226, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 (entry into force Dec. 17, 1975). Australia had been a party to this 
Convention since 1974. 
97. World Heritage (Western Tasmania Wilderness) Regulations. 
98. (1983) 57 Austl. L.J.R.450, 460-66 (Gibbs, C.].). 
99. AUSTL. CONST. § 51(29). Under this power, it was argued that the relevant sections of the Act and 
regulations gave effect to the World Heritage Convention. 
100. [d. § 51(26). Under this power, it was argued that the protection of Aboriginal sites was such a 
special law. 
101. [d. § 51(20). Under this power, it was argued that the Tasmanian Hydroelectric Commission was 
a trading corporation and was prevented from going ahead with the construction of the dam by those 
sections of the legislation addressed specifically to trading corporations. 
102. The use of the "implied national power" was based on judicial comments in Attorney-General 
(Victoria) v. Commonwealth, (1945) 71 C.L.R. 237, and in Victoria v. Commonwealth, (1975) 134 
C.L.R. 338. Under this power, it was argued that the areas were part of a distinctive national heritage 
which the national government could preserve if endangered. 
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Hydroelectric Commission from proceeding with the construction of the dam 
without the permission of the responsible federal Minister. 
A majority of the Court held that paragraph 9(l)(h) of the World Heritage 
Properties Conservation Act and the World Heritage Properties Conservation 
Reguiations !03 were valid under the external affairs power. 104 The majority 
reasoned that the prohibition of acts which were likely to damage or destroy 
items of the world heritage in Australia was a reasonable and appropriate way of 
fulfilling the obligations imposed on Australia by Articles 4 and 5 of the World 
Heritage Convention, namely, the taking of appropriate measures to identify 
and preserve items of the world heritage within its territory. 105 
The difference in views between the various members of the minority and 
majority resulted from different readings of the meaning of Koowarta (in each 
instance grounded in a particular vision of the appropriate balance of federal 
and state powers), and from divergent constructions of the Convention itself 
(informed by different understandings of the nature of the international legal 
process and the appropriate form of national participation in that process). The 
holdings of the m<uority and minority on the issues relevant in the present 
context are summarized below. 
1. Majority Holding 
The majority106 held that: (a) the external affairs power permitted the federal 
government to carry out treaty obligations by means of domestic legislation 
regardless of the subject matter of the treaty; 107 (b) Articles 4 and 5 of the 
Convention imposed obligations on Australia; 10M (c) the federal clause contained 
in the Convention, Article 34,109 was of no relevance to Australia, as implementa-
103. The effect of paragraph 9(1)(h) of the Act and the World Heritage (Properties Conservation) 
Regulations was to make unlawful the carrying out of works involving or associated with the construc-
tion of a dam, in an area that formed part of the world heritage, without the consent of the responsible 
federal Minister. 
104. (1983) 57 Austl. LJ.R. 450, at 491-92 (Mason,].), 505-09 (Murphy,j.), 534-36 (Brennan,j.). A 
majority of the Court also held that provisions of the legislation relying on the race power were 
supported by the external affairs power.Id. at 500-01 (Mason,j.), 510 (Murphy,j.), 537-39 (Brennan, 
].), 550-52 (Deane, ].). Mr. Justice Deane, however, took the view that the provisions effected an 
acquisition of property without just compensation, and therefore declared that the provisions as 
formulated were invalid.ld. at 555-59. Certain of the provisions relying on the corporations power were 
upheld, while a majority held that the provisions based on the implied national power were invalid.Id. 
at 478-79 (Gibbs, CJ.), 520 (Wilson, ].),542 (Deane, j.), 572-73 (Dawson, j.). See generally M. COPER, 
supra note 95. 
105. See Convention for the Protection and Preservation of the World Cultural and Natural Herit-
age, supra note 96. For the relevant provisions of Articles 4 and 5 of the Convention, see infra notes 
126-127. 
106. The majority consisted of Justices Mason, Murphy, Brennan, and Deane. 
107. (1983) 57 Austl. LJ.R. 450, 484-87 (Mason, j.), 506 (Murphy, j.), 526-27 (Brennan, j.), 544 
(Deane, ].). 
108. Id. at 489-90 (Mason, j.), 508-09 (Murphy, j.) 528-31 (Brennan, j.), 545-46 (Deane, j.). 
109. For the text of Article 34, see infra text accompanying note 140. 
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tion of the Conven tion was within the "legal jurisdiction" of the federal govern-
ment;110 and (d) paragraph 9(l)(h)111 of the Act in conjunction with the regula-
tions was a reasonable and appropriate manner of fulfilling Australia's obliga-
tions under the Conven tion. 112 
2. Minority Holding 
The minorityl13 held that: (a) the external affairs power extended to the 
implementation of treaties only if the treaty imposed an obligation and if the 
subject matter of the obligation was a matter of "international concern" (in the 
sense that failure by Australia to fulfill its obligation would be likely to affect 
significantly Australia's relations with other countries); 114 (b) Articles 4 and 5 of 
the Convention imposed no relevant obligations on Australia; 115 and (c) protec-
tion of items of the world heritage in Australia was not a "matter of international 
concern" in the same way that racial discrimination wasYs 
3. Analysis 
The majority judgments share a number of features that reflect an interna-
tionalist view of the world and of Australia's role in it. They embody a commit-
ment to the development of the international order by removing the internal 
fragmentation of the power to implement treaties, which had been a significant 
impediment to that development. This commitment amounts to the expression 
of a preference in favor of the demands of the international order over those 
arising from the federal aspects of the domestic order. The judgments also 
demonstrate a realistic understanding of the nature of international relations, 
and adopt an approach to the construction of treaties that is grounded more in 
international practice than in domestic concepts of statutory interpretation. 
The focus of the minority on the other hand, is far less internationalist. Their 
starting point is the premise that the states' desire to maintain as much autonomy 
as possible should be preferred to the needs of a national government or the 
international community. At the heart of the disagreement between the minority 
and majority is the minority's belief that the potential for the external affairs 
110. (1983) 57 Austl. L.].R. 450, 491 (Mason,].), 509 (Murphy,].), 531 (Brennan,].), 546-47 (Deane, 
j.). 
Ill. See supra note 104. 
112. (1983) 57 Austl. L.].R. 450, 493-94 (Mason, ].),509 (Murphy, j.), 534-36 (Brennan, j.), 548 
(Deane, ].). 
113. The minority consisted of Chief Justice Gibbs and Justices Wilson and Dawson. 
114. (1983) 57 Austl. L.].R. 450, 475-76 (Gibbs, c.n, 517-18 (Wilson, ].),563-65 (Dawson, ].). 
115. ld. at 470-72 (Gibbs, C.].), 514-16 (Wilson, J.), 563-65. Dawson,]. considered the case on the 
assumption that Articles 4 and 5 did impose obligations, although he considered that "there is much to 
be said for the view that no relevant obligatIOn is imposed by the Convention." /d. at 566. [For the text 
of Articles 4 and 5, see n.126-27 infra.) 
116. [d. at 475-76 (Gibbs, c.].), 516 (Wilson, ].),566-67 (Dawson, ].). 
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power to expand without limit to cover virtually all aspects of Australian life, 
with the result that the states would be reduced to mere formal entities, must be 
guarded against if the concept of federation is to be preserved. 117 Accordingly, 
some limit to the range of matters which could be covered by the external affairs 
power had to be found. Since Koowarta had ruled out the possibility of utilizing 
the untenable distinction between "domestic" and "international" matters,118 
some other distinction had to be divined. 
The solution arrived at by the minority, that the subject matter of the treaty 
had to be "of international concern," is just as unsatisfactory as the distinction 
rejected in Koowarta. Having been forced to accept the proposition that matters 
previously considered to be solely of domestic concern can become external 
affairs, the minority aimed to make the threshold for this change in characteriza-
tion as high as possible. In achieving this aim, the minority was forced to rely on 
an analysis of the world of international relations that was distorted, incoherent, 
and implausible. Furthermore, the minority's approach necessitated the adop-
tion by the Court of the task of assessing the nature and extent of international 
concern, in any particular instance, in order to determine whether Australia's 
relations would be affected significantly if the federal government failed to act in 
accordance with its treaty obligations. This is a task the Court is not well-
equipped to perform. 
The judgment of Chief Justice Gibbs exemplifies this approach. He wrote: 
The protection of the environment and the cultural heritage has 
been of increasing importance in recent times, but it cannot be said 
to have become such a burning international issue that a failure by 
one nation to take protective measures is likely adversely to affect its 
relations with other countries, unless of course damage or pollution 
extends beyond the borders. If one nation allows its own natural 
heritage (and no other) to be damaged, it is not in the least probable 
that other nations will act similarly in reprisal, or that the peace and 
security of the world will be disturbed - in this respect, damage to 
the heritage stands in clear contrast to such practices as racial dis-
crimination .... "9 
A passage from the judgment of Mr. Justice Wilson is also striking: 
When it is said that the subject matter of the Convention is a matter 
of international concern it may be relevant in judging the strength of 
that concern to observe that to date seventy-four nations have be-
come parties to it; that is to say, a little less than half the total 
117. Id. at 475 (Gibbs, C.].), 517 (Wilson, ].),564 (Dawson,].). See also supra text accompanying notes 
68-69. 
118. Koowarta, (1982) 56 Aust!. L.].R. 625, 645-46 (Stephen,].), 649-50 (Mason,].), 656 (Murphy,].), 
663-64 (Brennan, j.). 
119. (1983) 57 Aust!. LJ.R. 450, 475-76 (Gibbs, c.j.). 
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membership of the United Nations. Furthermore, there are some 
notable absentees from the list of parties, including the United 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, Belgium, Holland, Norway,12o 
Sweden, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and 
the Philippines. The significance of this observation depends upon 
the understanding that is to be given to the term "international 
concern" as used by Stephen J. in Koowarta and the capacity of a 
matter to affect Australia's relations with other nations .... Be that 
as it may, the extent and intensity of international concern that is 
reflected in the present Convention is in no way comparable to that 
which was evidenced by the Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination which was under consideration in KoowartaYl 
297 
It is unfortunate that racial discrimination was at issue in Koowarta, as it is one 
of the most compelling examples of general international consensus. The eleva-
tion of racial discrimination to the status of a paradigm of "international con-
cern" distorts the realities of international law and relations. To assert, as Mr. 
Justice Wilson does, that the participation of almost half the total membership of 
the United Nations in the World Heritage Convention does not make the 
preservation of the world heritage a matter of international concern because 
there were a number of "notable absentees," and because the extent and inten-
sity of international concern was not as great as it was in the case of the Racial 
Discrimination Convention, is wholly unpersuasive. 
The appeal to racial discrimination as a paradigm clearly represented an 
attempt by the minority to restrict the scope of the external affairs power as 
much as was possible while remaining consistent with the actual outcome in 
Koowarta. The minority also extrapolated from Koowarta the additional require-
ment, for a treaty obligation to be part of nation's external affairs, that there be a 
likelihood that, if Australia did not fulfill its obligations, its relations with other 
countries would be significantly affectedY" The minority considered that this 
additional requirement was not satisfied in the case of the World Heritage 
Convention. 123 No evidence is given to demonstrate that Australia's failure to 
fulfill its obligations would not adversely affect its relations with other nations, 
nor is there any indication of the standard by which the likelihood is to be 
determined judicially. The fact that some behavior (such as racial discrimination) 
produces international repercussions of considerable impact does not mean that 
other behavior (such as the failure to live up to one's obligations under the World 
Heritage Convention) will not also have serious consequences for Australia's 
relations with other countries. The view taken by the majority was that the 
120. l\orway was in fact a party to the World Heritage Convention, despite Mr. Justice Wilson's 
assertion to the contrary. See 1044 U.NT.S. 424 (ratification with effect from August 12, 1977). 
121. (1983) 57 Aust!. L.J.R. 450, 516 (Wilson, J.). 
122. Id. at 476 (Gibbs, C.].), 518 (Wilson,].), 567 (Dawson,].). 
123. Id. at 476, 518, 567. 
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existence of an international obligation was in itself sufficient to justify a pre-
sumption that failure by Australia to fulfill the obligation would have interna-
tional consequences, and that it was the executive's duty to assess the importance 
of these consequences. 124 
When interpreting the provisions of the Convention itself, the majority and 
minority disagreed on two important questions: first, whether the Convention 
imposed any relevant obligations on parties; and second, if so, whether the 
federal clause in any way limited the scope of that obligation in the case of 
Australia. The two members of the minority who considered these questions 125 
found that Articles 4 126 and 5127 of the Convention did not impose any obliga-
tions on the parties to the Convention. 128 In reaching this conclusion, they 
adopted a method of interpretation more suited to a carefully drafted domestic 
statute than to a document such as the Convention. Their conclusion was based 
on a number of factors, including: a comparison of the words used in Articles 4 
and 5 with those used in other articles of the Convention,129 and with language 
used in the Racial Discrimination Convention;130 the changes in language that 
had taken place during the drafting and adoption of the Convention reducing 
124. Id. at 692 (Mason, j.), 771 (Brennan, J). 
125. These two members were Gibbs, C.j. and Wilson, J Dawson, J assumed for the sake of 
argument that Articles 4 and 5 imposed obligations, but held the legislation to be invalid nonetheless. 
See Uf. at 566. 
126. Article 4 of the Convention provides: 
Each State Party to this Convention recognizes that the duty of ensuring the identification, 
protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural 
and natural heritage referred to in Articles I and 2 and situated on its territory, belongs 
primarily to that State. It will do all it can to this end, to the utmost of its own resources and, 
where appropriate, with any international assistance and cooperation, in particular, financial, 
artistic, scientific and technical, which it may be able to obtain. 
Convention for the Protection and Preservation of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, supra note 
96, art. 4. 
127. Article 5 of the Convention provides: 
To ensure that effective and active measures are taken for the protection, conservation and 
preservation of the cultural and natural heritage situated on its territory, each State Party to 
this Convention shall endeavor, in so far as possible, and as appropriate for each country: 
.... (d) to take the appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial mea-
sures necessary for the identification ... of this heritage .... 
Id. art. 5. 
128. (1983) 57 Austl. L.JR. 450, 469-73 (Gibbs, C.j.), 514-15 (Wilson, j.). 
129. ld. at 469 (Gibbs C.j.), 515 (Wilson, J). Articles 6(2), 6(3), 16(1) and 27(2) use the word 
"undertake"; Articles 17, 18 and 29(1) provide that the Parties "shall" do certain things. Convention for 
the Protection and Preservation of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, supra note 96. The 
obligations imposed by these Articles, however, do not seem significantly less vague or self-defining than 
the "duty" imposed by Article 4 and the "endeavour" required of a Party by Article 5. 
130. /d. at 515 (Wilson, J). Both Gibbs, C.J and Wilson, J also considered that the absence of a 
complaints procedure similar to that in the Racial Discrimination Convention militated against the 
existence of an obligation.ld. at 470,516. This is not a particularly persuasive argument in view of its 
failure to take into account the supervisory role of the World Hefltage Committee and the normal 
procedures available for raising grievances at the international level. 
1985) TASMANIAN DAMS CASE 299 
the burden on parties; 131 the self-defining nature of the "duties" imposed; 132 and 
the general respect for state sovereignty they saw embodied in the Convention. 133 
The majority adopted a different approach. It believed that the methods of 
construction appropriate to domestic statutes and contracts were not suitable 
when dealing with international conventions. 134 The obligation imposed by the 
Convention was to take appropriate steps to identify and preserve the world 
heritage and, although this meant that the exact details of performance would be 
decided by the nation involved, it still meant that there was an obligation on each 
party to consider in good faith what steps were appropriate for it to undertake. 
An allegation that this obligation had not been fulfilled was clearly a justiciable 
question. 135 In addition, the adoption by UNESCO of a resolution containing 
non-obligatory recommendations for protection of the cultural and natural 
heritage not forming part of the world heritage l36 at the same time as the 
convention was adopted confirmed the view of two members of the majority that 
the provisions of the Convention were intended to impose obligations. 137 
The majority's view that the Convention did impose obligations on Australia is 
considerably more persuasive than the interpretation offered by the minority. It 
seems clear that, even had the majority found that there was no obligation in a 
strict sense, at least some of the majority (if not all of them) may still have held 
the law to be a valid exercise of the external affairs power. 138 
Article 34 of the Convention,139 the federal clause, also gave rise to the 
expression of contrary views by various members of the Court. Article 34 
provides: 
The following provisions shall apply to those States Parties to this 
Convention which have a federal or non-unitary constitutional sys-
tem: 
(a) with regard to the provisions of this convention, the implementa-
131. Id. at 472-73 (Gibbs, C.J.). 515 (Wilson. j.). See generally Goy. The International Protection ofthe 
Cultural and Natural Heritage, 4 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 117. 135-36 (1973); Meyer, Travaux Preparatorits for 
the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, 2 EARTH L.j. 45,49-50 (1976). 
132. (1983) 57 Au~tl. L.J.R. 450, 470-72 (Gibbs. C.J.). 
133. As evidenced, inter alia. by references to respect for the sovereignty of Parties in Articles 5. 6( I) 
and II and Article 34, as well as references to the protection of property rights.ld. at 470 (Gibbs. C.J.). 
514-15 (Wilson. j.), 567 (Dawson. J.). 
134. For example. Mr. Justice Deane wrote: "it would be contrary to both the theory and practice of 
international law to ... deny the existence of international obligations unless they be defined with the 
degree of precision necessary to establish a legally enforceable agreement under the common law." Id. 
at 546 (Deane. j.). See also id. at 509 (Murphy, J.). 530-31 (Brennan. J.). 
135.ld. at 489-90 (Mason, J.). 509 (Murphy. j.). 530-31 (Brennan. J.). 546 (Deane. j.). 
136. UNESCO Doc. 17C1107.16Nov. 1972. reproduced in lllNT'LLEGALMATERIALS 1367-74(1972). 
137. (1983) 57 Ausd. L.J.R. 450. 490 (Mason, j.). 531 (Brennan. J.); Contra id. at 473 (Gibbs, C.j.). 
525 (Wilson, J.). 566 (Dawson. J.). 
138. Id. at 490-91 (Mason. j.). 505-06 (Murphy. J.). 530 (Brennan. j.). 544-45 (Deane. J.). 
139. Convention for the Protection and Preservation of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. 
sufrra note 96. art. 34. 
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tion of which comes under the legal jurisdiction of the federal or 
central legislative power, the obligations of the federal or central 
government shall be the same as for those States Parties which are 
not federal States; 
(b) with regard to the provisions ofthis convention, the implementa-
tion of which comes under the legal jurisdiction of individual con-
stituent States, counties, provinces or cantons that are not obliged by 
the constitutional system of the federation to take legislative mea-
sures, the federal government shall inform the competent au-
thorities of such States, counties, provinces or cantons of the said 
provisions, with its recommendation for their adoption. 140 
All members of the majority held that the effect of the federal clause could 
only be ascertained after a determination of whether the federal government 
had the legislative power to implement the obligations imposed by Articles 4 and 
5 of the Convention. 141 As they held that the federal government did have this 
power, they reasoned that implementation of these articles came within the legal 
jurisdiction of the federal government and Article 34(b) had no application. 142 
The fact that the federal government and the Tasmanian government had 
concurrent legislative power in this case did not affect the position. 
This interpretation of Article 34 is clearly correct. Any argument that the 
existence of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction brought the implementa-
tion of the treaty within the jurisdiction of a constituent state, for the purpose of 
Article 34(b), would run counter to the rationale behind the use of federal 
clauses and for the insertion of this particular federal clause. Federal clauses are 
a departure from equality of obligation as between unitary and federal states and 
are a concession ·to federal states in order to facilitate their participation in 
treaties to which they might not otherwise be able to become parties. Accord-
ingly, such clauses should not be broadly construed to limit the obligations of 
federal states as opposed to unitary states. In the case of the World Heritage 
Convention, the clause appears to have been inserted as a result of the assertion 
by the Austrian government that the Austrian federal government had neither 
exclusive nor concurrent power over most of the matters covered by the Conven-
tion. 143 Thus, it would seem incontrovertible that in a case where the federal 
government possesses concurrent power, Article 34(a) should apply. 
140. [d. 
141. (1983) 57 Austl. LJ.R. 491 (Mason,].), 509 (Murphy,].), 531 (Brennan,].), 546-47 (Deane,].). 
142. [d. 
143. The travaux preparatories show that Austria stated that it would be unable to ratify the Conven-
tion if no reservations were permitted, because of its constitutional distribution of powers (under which 
the Lander possessed power over conservation of nature, building, and land use planning). UNESCO 
Doc. SCH/MD/18/Annex 1 at 2 and Annex II para. 7. The result was the insertion of Article 33. 
UNESCO Doc. 17 CIl8/Annex, p~ra. 56. Cf supra note 71. 
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Nonetheless, Mr. Justice Dawson was prepared to advance a rather unor-
thodox interpretation of the clause. He argued that, assuming the Convention 
imposed relevant obligations, the nature of those obligations required for their 
fulfillment the formation of a judgment involving a "balancing of environmen-
tal, social and economic considerations which are by no means wholly, or even 
largely, entrusted to the Commonwealth."144 The Commonwealth was not in a 
position to exercise such judgment in relation to the energy needs of Tasmania 
and it followed "inevitably" from this that the obligations under Articles 4 and 5 
did not come within the jurisdiction of the federal government. Not only is this 
premise of the inability of the Commonwealth to make an informed judgment 
highly questionable (as is the restriction of the inquiry solely to questions of state 
energy needs), but Mr. Justice Dawson's "inevitable" conclusion is also a non 
sequitur in view of the fact that the clause speaks of "legal" jurisdiction and not 
of optimal administrative and operational arrangements. Such an interpretation 
of Article 34 involves a distortion of the clear terms of the Article and of the 
intent with which it was inserted in the Convention. 145 
4. The Likely Impact of the Dams Case on Australian Federal Relations 
The decision in the Dams case was greeted with prophecies of doom for the 
Australian federal system by advocates of states' rights. Premier Bjelke-Petersen 
of Queensland, an avid states' rights advocate and one of the defendants in the 
Koowarta case,146 described the decision as "the first big crack in our federal 
system since Federation," and called for a referendum to amend the Constitu-
tion so that the High Court would be required to reach a unanimous decision in 
cases involving states' rights before a federal law would be upheld. 147 The acting 
leader of the federal opposition expressed similar sentiments,148 and one news-
paper editorial predicted that the result of the decision would be an increase in 
the size of Australian delegations sent overseas to negotiate treaties "as the States 
scramble to assert their interest in foreign affairs."149 
The legal and historical realities of Australia's development belie the accuracy 
of the prophecies of doom uttered by states' rights advocates. The Dams case is 
144. (1983) 57 Aust!' LJ.R. 450, 568-69 (Dawson, J.). 
145. Mr. Justice Wilson inexplicably saw the clause as tending to confirm that the Convention sought 
to achieve its purposes "by a conciliatory and informal engagement of international relationships" 
falling short of creating any obligations. ld. at 516-17. He also combined the "effective level of 
decision-making" argument of Mr. Justice Dawson with the argument that, as in his view the federal 
government does not have the power to implement the treaty, Article 34(a) has no application. His 
whole discussion, however, is less than lucid. Chief Justice Gibbs does not express a concluded view on 
the issue, See id. at 472. 
146. (1982) 56 Aust!' LJ.R. 625. See supra text accompanying notes 74-83. 
147. The Sydney Morning Herald, July 2, 1983, at 6. 
148. He stated, "[i]t effectively marks the beginning of the end for the keystone of our federal system 
- the sovereign rights of the States - and perhaps even for the system itself." ld. at 6. 
149. ld. at 12. See also 57 AUST. L.J. 487-88 (1983). 
302 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VIII, No.2 
not an isolated and unanticipated explosion of federal power; rather, it is one of 
a series of High Court decisions since federation which have adopted broad 
interpretations of federal power. 150 
The confirmation of federal power to regulate areas traditionally subject to 
state control does not inevitably lead to major intrusions by the federal govern-
ment into those areas. The external affairs power is no exception, and the extent 
of its use to regulate subjects under state control will be influenced by political 
and institutional pressures, as well as by the extent of commitment by different 
federal and state governments to the substantive policies embodied in interna-
tional instruments. The rhetoric of both the states' rights advocates and cen-
tralists in the wake of the Dams case is part of the ongoing debate attempting to 
limit or to legitimize the federal government's intrusion into more and more 
areas traditionally regulated by the states. 
The Dams case has clearly established the power of the federal government to 
implement treaties whatever their subject matter, provided that the implement-
ing legislation is a reasonably appropriate way of carrying out the terms of the 
treaty and does not infringe any express or implied constitutional prohibition. 151 
While the decision has been hailed as a significant legal event, the question arises 
as to what practical impact the affirmation of broad federal power in this area 
will have. The purpose of the following section is to assess the likely impact of the 
Dams case against the background of Australian domestic and international 
practice relating to treaties and their implementation. 
V. AUSTRALIAN TREATY PRACTICE: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 
CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Federal States and International Treaties 
Under most federal constitutions, the central government is primarily, if not 
exclusively, responsible for the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs, and 
150. The case can be viewed "as part of a fairly consistent trend in High Court cases over many years 
to enhance the power of the Commonwealth." M. COPER, supra note 95, at 25. See also W.G. McMINN, A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 0.- AUSTRALIA 169-79 (1979); Hutchinson, Australian Federalism, in THE 
PIECES OF POLITICS 193-94 (R. Lucy 3d ed. 1983). A similar trend has been evident, if not inevitable, in 
the other classical models of federal systems of government. K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
237-38 (4th ed. 1963). For a recent illustration of insistence on the requirement that the implementing 
legislation conform to the terms of the relevant treaty, see Kirmani v. Captain Cook Cruises Party Ltd., 
(1985) 59 Austl. L.].R. 265,270-71 (Gibbs, C.].), 278-79 (Wilson,].), 309-10 (Dawson,].). Thesejudges, 
who dissented in the result on other grounds, were the only members of the court to deal with this issue 
as to constitutional prohibitions. 
151. See generally M. COPER,supra note 95, at 9-10, 21-22. The express prohibitions of the Constitu-
tion are contained in AUSTL. CON ST. §§ 92, 99, 113, 114, 116, and 117. The most important of these 
prohibitions has been the guarantee of freedom of interstate trade (id. § 92). The implied prohibitions 
prevent the Commonwealth from legislating in violation of the separation of powers, from imposing a 
discriminatory burden on the states, or from threatening their capacity to function in the federal 
system. 
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generally possesses exclusive capacity to enter into treaties. A federal govern-
ment, however, may be reluctant to enter into, or implement treaties without the 
acquiescence or agreement of its states and may therefore emphasize in both the 
domestic and international arenas the necessity or desirability of consulting with 
the constituent member of the federation prior to assuming treaty obligations. 
Internationally, it may also argue that some special provision should be made for 
it in view of its federal nature. There are a number of reasons why such a policy 
may be adopted by a federal government participating in the drafting of a 
convention. First, there may be a perceived or actual lack of federal power to 
implement the provisions of a treaty or class of treaties. Second, it may be the 
states which, in many cas.es, can most effectively implement the treaty in practice, 
since in areas traditionally regulated by the states the necessary administrative 
structures will often already be in place. Third, there may be the necessity of 
ascertaining whether law and practice is in accordance with the provisions of the 
treaty in cases where this is a prerequisite to ratification - in relation to state law 
and practice such information is most efficiently obtained by means of input 
from the states themselves. Fourth, there may be political disadvantages result-
ing from action by the federal government without consultation with the states; 
conversely, political benefits may accrue from a readiness to cooperate with the 
states. Fifth, as a tactic of delay or concealment, decisions that could prove 
difficult or unpopular in the domestic context may be hidden behind rhetoric 
about considerations of federalism; similarly, on the international level, a lack of 
commitment to a particular convention, or the desire to appear to be supporting 
a measure while not in fact undertaking an obligation, may also be concealed 
behind the rhetoric or reality of the demands of the federal system. 
Much has been written analyzing the behavior of federal states in the formula-
tion and ratification of multilateral conventions, particularly International 
Labour Organisation Conventions and United Nations human rights instru-
ments. It has been shown that the existence of a broad or restricted power to 
implement treaties and the insertion of federal clauses have been relatively 
unimportant factors in explaining the pattern of ratification of these conventions 
by federal states. 152 In other contexts a reluctance to ratify multilateral treaties 
has also been evident, although to a lesser extent. 153 Very often political consid-
erations or substantive disagreement with a particular policy explains such be-
havior, yet in many cases these influences have been concealed behind the 
rhetoric of federalism. The extent of federal reluctance or indifference may vary 
from issue to issue and according to the political complexion of governments at 
the state and federal level. The next section discusses the political background of 
Australia's treaty practice. 
152. See H. Charlesworth, supra note 75, at 18-38,90-92; I. BERNIER,supra note 24, at 152-71 (1973). 
153. See generally I. BERNIER, supra note 24. 
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B. Australia: The Political Background 
The history of government in Australia at the federal level has been primarily 
the story of competition between the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and the 
anti-Labor parties. The dominant post-war anti-Labor force has been the coali-
tion formed by the Liberal Party of Australia (LP A) and the Country Party 
(which changed its name to the National Country Party in 1974). Since 1949 the 
LiberaVCountry Party coalition has governed for the greatest length of time. 154 
The difference between the Labor Party and the conservative parties has been 
summarized as follows: 
The Labor Party and other groups on the left have traditionally been 
self-conscious advocates of strengthening the powers of the central 
government, especially for welfare and industrial legislation and 
economic management. After some early experiments at state level 
with public enterprises and welfare legislation, Labor increasingly 
focused on the federal level as crucial for implementing social re-
forms and economic coordination, a focus which was reinforced by 
the experience of wars, depression, and the growing fiscal domi-
nance of the federal government. 
Conservative parties, on the other hand, have traditionally sup-
ported a 'federalist' ideology whereby the 'checks and balances' of 
the federal system would constitute a safeguard against socialist 
concentration. Individual liberty would thus be preserved and the 
interests of regions would be better served by strong State-level 
governments in touch with local needs and desires. l55 
The Labor Party has differed from the Liberal-National Party in several 
aspects that are relevant in the present context. First, the Labor Party has 
maintained a commitment to far-reaching economic and social reform in accor-
dance with socialist principles (in practice now a form of democratic socialism 
along Western European lines), while the Liberal-National Party has been com-
mitted to the principles of free enterprise. Second, the Labor Party has been 
willing to diminish the importance of the states in the federal system, by abolish-
ing them (pre-1971 platform), or by bypassing them (1972-75 practice), while the 
Liberal-National Party has been committed to cooperation with the states and 
preservation of their autonomy in many areas. l56 Third, the Labor Party has 
154. Since 1949, competing factions have governed Australia; 1949-1972, Liberal/Country Party; 
1972-75, Australian Labor Party; 1975-83, Liberal/National Country Party; 1983-Present, Australian 
Labor Party. 
155. B. Head, The Political Grisis of Australian Federalism, in AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM: FUTURE TENSE 
75, 81-82 (A. Patience & J. Scott eds. 1983). See allO Sawer, The United Nations, in AUSTRALIA IN WORLD 
AFFAIRS 1956-60, at 157 (G. Greenwood & N. Harper eds. 1963); Maddox, The Federal Environment of 
Australian politics, in MAN AND THE AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENT 295-301 (W. Hanley & M. Cooper eds. 
1982). For a general description of the policies and practices of the three parties, see essays by Jaensch, 
Lucy, and Cribb in THE PIECES OF POLITICS (R. Lucy 3d ed. 1983). 
156. J. HOLMES & C. SHARMAN, THE AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL SVSTEM 19-21 (1977). 
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been committed to the international order and international standard-setting, 
and to a belief in the potential of the external affairs power to expand federal 
power, particularly in the area of human rights and social justice. ls7 The 
Liberal-National coalition, in contrast, has shown a lesser commitment to the 
development of international human rights standards (especially those which 
aimed to protect interests other than those traditionally cherished by proponents 
of free enterprise) and a general lack of enthusiasm for using the external affairs 
power to override the states and accumulate more power in the federal govern-
ment. 
Generally, the Labor Party has been more adventurous than conservative 
governments in its use of the external affairs power. Indeed, it is the ALP that 
has experimented with a whole range of previously unexploited federal powers 
in order to implement its policies. As discussed earlier,l58 the emphasis in Austra-
lian federal constitutional law has been the continuing effort to find affirmative 
grants of power among those enumerated in the Constitution to support particu-
lar exercises offederallegislative power. Unlike the position in the United States, 
with one exception, negative restrictions on exercises of power have not proved 
to be of particularly great importance. ls9 Interestingly, the Constitution, a crea-
ture of the 1890's, in its conception and allocation of powers, is inherently biased 
against socialist initiatives as well as radical and liberal reforms of a much more 
modest nature. 160 Labor Party governments have been prepared to rely on the 
external affairs power as a basis for implementing in its entirety a treaty that they 
support, as well as relying on it in cases where one or more articles of a treaty 
provide a convenient hook on which to hang a legislative provision that forms 
part of a larger policy and which can be supported by no other head of power. 
On the other hand, the discussion which follows will show that the Labor 
Party, as well as the Liberal-National coalition, has also consistently engaged in 
consultation and cooperation with the states in relation to questions of treaties, 
although in cases where state cooperation has not been forthcoming and the 
Labor Party has been strongly committed to a particular policy, it has been 
prepared to act unilaterally.161 
157. In relation to the attitude of the Labor Party when in power in the 1940s, see Bailey, supra note 
14, at 291. 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 9-13. 
159. See generally M. COPER, FREEDOM OF INTERSTATE TRADE UNDER THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 
(1983). The guarantee of freedom of interstate trade is one exception where a negative restriction on 
the exercise of power has proven significant. See AUSTL. CONST. § 92. 
160. See, e.g., Sawer, The Constitutional Crisis of Australian Federalism, in AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM: 
FUTURE TENSE 94, 10 1-03 (A. Patience & J. Scott eds. 1983); Patience, Bypassing Liberalism: Con-
stitutionalism in Australian Politics, in CRITICAL ESSAYS IN AUSTRALIAN POLITICS 97, 104-10 (G. Duncan ed. 
1978). 
161. Since 1945 there have been four major High Court cases dealing with the external affairs 
power. See Airlines ofN.S.W. v. N.S.W. (No.2), (1965) 113 C.L.R. 54; Seas and Submerged Lands case, 
(1975) 135 C.L.R. 337; Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, (1982) 56 Aust!. L.J.R. 625; Tasmanian Dams case, 
(1983) 57 Aust!' L.J.R. 450. All have been discussed supra. Of these cases, all but Airlines of N.S.W. 
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1. 1949-72: A Conservative Era 
While many commentators considered that the Burgess decisionl62 had estab-
lished beyond doubt that the federal government had full power to implement 
treaties,l63 the clear pronouncements of the Court in that case were diluted over 
time by political realities to the extent that, by 1972, it was difficult to assume 
confidently that federal legislation implementing a treaty would be upheld 
whatever the subject matter of the treaty. The outbreak of the Second World 
War shortly after Burgess had meant that the federal government's power over 
"naval and military defense"l64 had expanded during the war and the immediate 
post-war period to allow the Commonwealth to regulate many areas of activity 
that were beyond its power in peacetime. 
With the election of 1949, a Liberal-Country Party coalition, which would rule 
the country for almost twenty-five years, came to power. During this coalition's 
tenure, there was little resort to the treaty power to enact either wide-ranging 
social reforms or even less ambitious measures which would have encroached 
upon areas traditionally regulated by the states. This attitude was the result of a 
lack of commitment to various social policies initiated by the United Nations and 
associated bodies, the coalition's desire to preserve states' rights from federal 
encroachment, and a general philosophy of minimal governmental regulation. 165 
From 1949 until 1972, the federal government continued to adopt the practice 
that had been followed since the early days of Australia's independent participa-
tion in international fora: 
[t]he Commonwealth was still reluctant to pass ancillary legislation 
for execution of treaties which fell within the sphere of the State 
legislative authority. For this it depended on the acquiescence ofthe 
States, and the States have thus pressed their claims that the Com-
monwealth recognizes [sic] the desirability of consultation with the 
States in respect of all Conventions, the extension of which or adher-
ence to which involves the cooperation of the State Governments. l66 
involved challenges to legislation that had been passed by a federal Labor government over opposition 
from all states or from the states most directly affected by the legislation. 
162. (1936) 55 C.L.R. 608. Set supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text. 
163. See, e.g., 45 AUSTL. L.J. 652 (letter by Evatt); Bailey , supra note 14, at 304-06; Sorensen,supra note 
72, at 204; Looper, Federal State Clauses in Multilateral Instruments, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. L. 162, 163 
(1955-56). The government of the day took a more restricted view. Bailey, supra note 14, at 291. 
164. See AUSTL. CONST., § 51(6). 
165. See, e.g., Sawer,supra note 155, at 157-58; Lane, External Ajjairs Power, 40 AUSTL. L.J. 257 (1966); 
Howard, The External Affairs Power oj the Commonwealth, 8 MELB. V.L. REv. 193, 213-14 (1971); V. 
WINDEYER, SOME ASPECTS OF AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 48-49 (1972). 
166. G. DOEKER, THE TREATy-MAKING POWER IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 241 (1966). See 
also L. WILDHABER, TREATY MAKING POWER AND CONSTITUTION 301-02 (1971); Sawer, Australian Con-
stitutional Law in Relation to International Relations and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
AUSTRALIA 45-47 (D.P. O'Connell ed. 1965); Bailey, supra note 14, at 297. 
The attitude of the Liberal-Country Party government was captured in a response by the Prime 
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The process of consultation and cooperation with the states in areas other than 
labor matters and human rights instruments can be illustrated by reference to 
treaties dealing with ocean pollution, narcotic drugs and foreign arbitral awards. 
For example, in 1962, Australia ratified the International Convention for the 
Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954.167 Prior to ratification of this 
Convention, the Commonwealth and the states had consulted over a number of 
years to create a package of complementary federal and state laws regulating the 
matters eventually covered by the Convention. The state laws dealt with matters 
within traditional state competence; the federal laws regulated those activities 
which fell outside state legislative power. l66 
A similar approach was adopted in relation to the Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs 1961. 169 The federal government had traditionally regulated the 
import and export of drugs while the states had traditionally regulated the sale, 
possession, and consumption of dangerous substances. The question of ratifica-
tion of the Convention was referred to the states, all of which had agreed by 1962 
to undertake the obligations imposed by the Convention yo It took until 1967 for 
a complementary scheme of federal and state legislation to be enacted in con-
formity with the provisions of the Convention, with importation and manufac-
ture being subject to federal control, and other aspects being subject to state 
regulation. l7l 
Another major instance of joint federaVstate action in the area of foreign 
affairs was the scheme developed to regulate the exploitation of Australia's 
offshore resources. Rather than resolve the issue of which government owned 
the resources of the territorial sea, its subsoil, and the continental shelf, the 
Liberal-National federal government sponsored a complicated interlocking sys-
tem of federal and state laws as a compromise. l72 When Liberal Prime Minister 
Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, when asked when Australia would ratify the Convention on the Political 
Rights of Women, 193 V.N.T.S. 135: "Some changes in Australian law and procedure would be 
necessary before Australia could become a party to the Convention. The position is complicated by the 
fact that many of the matters in question are within the competence of the State governments." 28 
AUSTL. PARL. DEB., H.R. 849-50 (1960). The convention was not ratified by Australia until 10 December 
1974. 
167. 327 V.N.T.S. 3. 
168. G. DOEKER,supra note 166, at 227-31 (1966). Doeker's assumption, however, that the consulta-
tion was the result of a lack of federal power to legislate, is incorrect; administrative convenience 
appears to have been the real motivation. Connell, International Agruments and tM Australian Treaty 
Power, 1968-69 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 83, 98. 
169. 520 V.N.T.S. 151. Australia signed the Convention on March 30, 1961, and ratified it on 
December I, 1967. Australia signed and ratified the 1972 Protocol Amending the Single Convention on 
November 22, 1972. 
170. REPORT OF THE GoVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1962 ON THE WORKING OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON NARCOTIC DRUGS. 
171. REPORT OF THE GoVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA FOR THE CALENDAR YEAR 1967 ON THE WORKING OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON NARCOTIC DRUGS. The area of drugs is regulated by both state and 
federal authorities in close cooperation through permanent and ad hoc arrangements. 
172. See Harders, Australia's Offshore Petroleum Legislation: A Survey of Its Constitutional Background and 
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John Gorton attempted to introduce legislation in 1970 that would vest overrid-
ing control over offshore resources in the federal government, his attempts were 
roundly defeated by the states' rights proponents in the Liberal Party. 173 
The 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards174 was another instance in which the federal govern-
ment opted for cooperative rather than unilateral action. Although the Com-
monwealth would have had the power to legislate in relation to foreign arbitral 
awards, the federal government sought the cooperation of the states in imple-
menting the Convention, as the related area of recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments had traditionally been the subject of state legislation. In 1969, 
it appeared that an agreement had been reached which would allow the federal 
government to ratify the Convention in advance of the enactment of state 
legislation on the basis of assurances from the states that the uniform implement-
ing legislation would be passed. l75 In fact, the Convention was not ratified until 
1973 on the basis of federal legislation; even by that time not all states had 
enacted implementing legislation. 176 
Liberal-Country governments continued to follow the procedure of consulta-
tion that had been adopted previously in relation to International Labour Or-
ganisation (ILO) Conventions. From its earliest contacts with the ILO, the 
Australian federal government had adopted the practice of referring Conven-
tions involving the states to the states for consideration. The federal government 
then would ratify a Convention only if all states agreed to ratification, and if it 
were satisfied that Australian law and practice in all jurisdictions was in confor-
mity with the Convention. 177 
In the period from. 1949 to 1972, Australia ratified eighteen ILO Conventions, 
more than half of which were Conventions adopted prior to 1949. 178 Unratified 
Its Federal Features, 6 MELB. V.L. REv. 415 (1968). See also Thompson, Australian Petroleum Legislation and 
the Canadian Experience, 6 MELB. V.L. REV. 370,378 (1968) (comparing the success of the Australian 
solution with the problems of the V.S. attempts). 
173. See, e.g., H.V. EMY, THE POLITICS OF AUSTRALIAN DEMOCRACY 47 (2d ed. 1978); Connell, supra 
note 119, at 84; Gorton, Australian Federalism: A View from Canberra, in AUSTRALIAN FEDERALISM: FUTURE 
TENSE 12,23-24 (A. Patience & J. Scott eds. 1983). The proposed legislation was the Territorial Sea and 
Continental Shelf Bill 1970, which was subsequently taken over by the Labor government of 1972-75. 
174. 330 V.N.T.S. 3. 
175. Note, 43 AUSTL. L.J. 344·45 (1969). 
176. 92 AUSTL. PARL. DEB., H.R., 4390-93 (1974). 
177. Bailey, supra note 14. See also G. DOEKER, supra note 166, at 231; REVIEW OF AUSTRALIAN LAW 
AND PRACTICE RELATING TO CONVENTIONS ADOPTED BY THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE 
(1969), Parliamentary Paper No. 197, 1969, at 7. 
178. See l.L.O. No.2, 38 V.N.T.S. 41; No. 10,38 V.N.T.S. 143; No. 11,38 V.N.T.S. 153; No. 12,38 
V.N.T.S. 165; No. 18,38 V.N.T.S. 243; No. 19,38 V.N.T.S. 257; No. 42, 40 V.N.T.S. 19; No. 45, 40 
V.N.T.S. 63; No. 85, 214 V.N.T.S. 33; No. 88, 70 V.N.T.S. 85; No. 93 (pre-1949). See also l.L.O. No. 99, 
172 V.N.T.S. 159; No. 105,320 V.N.T.S. 291; No. 112,413 V.N.T.S. 147; No. 116,423 V.N.T.S. 11; 
No. 122,569 V.N.T.S. 65; No. 123,610 V.N.T.S. 79 (post.1949). See generally International Labour 
Office, RATIFICATIONS OF CONVENTIONS, International Labour Conference, 68th Session 1982, Report 
III (pI. 5). 
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Conventions included the Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection 
1948 (No. 87),179 the Convention on the Right to Organize and Collective Bar-
gaining 1949 (No. 98),180 the Convention on Equal Remuneration 1951 (No. 
100),181 and the Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Populations 1957 (No. 
107).182 
The draft Covenants on Human Rights, and the Covenants as finally adopted, 
were also referred to the states with a view to ratification. The reaction of the 
states and the less than fervent commitment by the federal government to their 
ratification meant that by the end of 1972, Australia had neither signed nor 
ratified the Covenants. 183 
One important result of the federal government's espousal of cooperative 
federalism was its support for the insertion of federal clauses in a number of 
multilateral instruments. Australia supported the insertion of federal clauses in 
the Convention on the Status of Refugees 1951 (Article 41),184 the Convention 
for the Suppression of Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitu-
tion of Others 1950,185 and the Human Rights Covenants. l86 
In sum, the period from 1949 to 1972 was relatively uneventful as far as 
federal use of the external affairs power was concerned. The prevalence of 
conservative social ideas, a commitment to the preservation of states' rights, and 
a reluctance to accommodate the domestic order to the changing demands of the 
international order were characteristic of Australian federal governments of the 
period. As a result, there was little incentive for the Liberal-Country Party 
governments to attempt to expand the ambit of the power, at the expense ofthe 
states, to implement its policies. 
2. 1972-75: The Whitlam Labor Government 
The election of the Whitlam Labor government in December 1972 initiated a 
period of commitment to widespread social reform, the centralization of power 
in Canberra in order to achieve this reform, and experimentation with a number 
of previously unexploited heads of federal legislative power. Inevitably, the 
government collided with the states and states' rights advocates on a number of 
occasions. The government saw Australia as a nation with domestic problems 
179. 68 V.N.T.S. 17. 
180. 96 V.N.T.S. 257. 
181. 165 V.N.T.S. 303. 
182. 328 V.N.T.S. 247. See 125 AusTL. PARL. DEB. 2927 (1981) (Reply of the Minister for Industrial 
Relations to Question on Notice No. 2713). 
183. For a description of the consultation up to 1966, see G. DOEKER, supra note 166, at 223-27. 
184. 189 V.N.T.S. 137. See also I. BERNIER, supra note 24, at 178. 
185. 96 V.N .T.S. 271. See also Liang, Colonial Clauses and Federal Clauses in United Nations Multilateral 
Instruments, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 108, 122-23 (1951). 
186. Looper, supra note 163, at 188. See also Sorensen,supra note 72, at 199; Liang, supra note 185, at 
128. 
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which required resolution on a national scale, and it also believed that only one 
Australian voice, that of the federal government, should be heard abroad. It 
relied upon an expansive reading of the external affairs power to help it imple-
ment its policies. The comments of the then Attorney-General Murphy 
exemplify the government's approach: "If Australia is to fulfill its proper role in 
international affairs, the national Parliament must be able to give full effect to 
treaties and other international instruments without the need to seek legislation 
by the six State pariiaments."187 Among policies pursued by the federal govern-
ment were: the assertion of overriding federal jurisdiction over the resources of 
the territorial sea, its subsoil, and the continental shelf; the attainment of an 
acceptable standard of human rights for all Australians, particularly in the area 
of racial discrimination; and the abolition of residual constitutional links with the 
United Kingdom. l88 
The federal government took the view that, while in some cases cooperative 
action with the states was desirable, in those cases in which some or all of the 
states were unwilling to cooperate and the Commonwealth was firmly committed 
to a particular policy, the Commonwealth would move unilaterally to ratify and 
implement the relevant international convention. 189 
The most notable example of the government's expansive use of the external 
affairs power to implement its policies was the action it took in relation to human 
rights. Australia had signed the International Covenant on Economic, Cultural 
and Social Rights 1966 190 in December 1972, and ratified it on December 10, 
1975.191 The government also acceded to the Convention on the Political Rights 
of Women 1953,192 ratified the International Convention for the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965,193 and signed the International Coven-
ant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR).194 Legislation was introduced to 
187. PROCEEDINGS OF THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1973,213 (Sydney, 1973). See 
generally Evans, New Directions in Australian Race Relations Law, 48 AUSTL. L.J. 479 (1974); EVANS,Benign 
Discrimination and the Right to Equality, 6 FED. L. REV. 26 (1974); Crommelin and Evans, Explorations and 
Adventures with Commonwealth Powers, in LABOR AND THE CONSTITUTION 1972-75, at 48-49 (G. Evans ed. 
1977). 
188. See generally Sawer, supra note 160, at 95-98. 
189. For example, the Whitlam government implemented the New York Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 1975,330 V.N.T.S. 3, in view of the failure of 
the states to pass uniform state legislation. See Arbitration (Foreign Awards and Agreements) Act 1974 
(Cth) and Cumulative Supplement (No.4) to Australian Treaty List, AUSTL. T. SER. 1982, No. 10, at 43 
(entry into force for Australia 24 June 1975). 
190. 993 V.N.T.S. 3. 
191. 993 V.N.T.S. 4. The Whitlam Government was dismissed from office on November 11, 1975, 
but the ratification of the ICECSR was presumably the result of efforts of the Whitlam government 
rather than a new initiative on the part of the Fraser government. 
192. 193 V.N.T.S. 135. See Cumulative Supplement (No.4) to Australian Treaty List, AUSTL. T. SER. 
1982, No.lO at 46 (entry into force for Australia 30 October 1975). 
193. 660 V.N.T.S. 195. 
194. 999 V.N.T.S. 171. 
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implement the ICCPR195 and the Racial Discrimination Convention. The former, 
the Human Rights Bill 1973, eventually lapsed; the latter was passed into law as 
the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, which was the legislation that was upheld (in 
an amended form) in Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen. 196 
The Whitlam Labor government repudiated the cooperative scheme adopted 
by the Liberal-Country government for regulating offshore resources, and 
passed the Seas and Submerged Lands Act 1973 (Cth) over opposition from all 
states, including those with Labor governments. 197 
The other battles between the Commonwealth and states involved the aboli-
tion of residual links with the United Kingdom, and negotiations to establish a 
boundary in the Torres Strait between Australia and Papua New Guinea. All 
non-Labor states, and some Labor states, opposed unilateral attempts by the 
Commonwealth to sever the remaining legal links to the United Kingdom; the 
issue was unresolved when the government was dismissed in 1975.198 In relation 
to the conclusion of a boundary treaty with Papua New Guinea, the Queensland 
government refused to cooperate with the federal government until 1978.199 
The Labor government was determined to have Australia enjoy its full inter-
national personality, and not be an "international cripple"20o as a result of the 
demands of the federal system. This attitude was shown by the apparent reversal 
of Australia's stance on federal clauses. For example, the Australian delegation 
to the Diplomatic Conference on Wills201 in Washington, D.C. in 1974, stated 
that it was opposed to the insertion of any form of federal clause in the Draft 
Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will202 on 
195. Id. 
196. See supra text accompanying notes 74-92. An example of a resort to the external affairs power to 
help implement a general policy was the selection of Article 10(b) of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, as revised at Stockholm in 1967,21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923; 
24 U.S.T. 2140, T.I.A.S. No. 7727, to support section 55 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), which 
prohibited a person from engaging in misleading conduct in relation to "the nature, the manufacturing 
process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose or the quantity of any goods." The 
provisions would 'certainly have been unconstitutional, at least in part, but for the Convention, and 
commentators were unclear as to whether the selection of an isolated provision of the Convention could 
justify the provision as the implementation of a treaty. Evans, The Constitutional Validity and Scope of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974, 49 AUSTL. L.J. 654, 668-69 (1975). See also G.Q. TAPERELL, R.B. VERMEESCH & 
D.J. HARLAND, TRADE PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION [1468]-[1470] (2d ed. 1978); J.J. GOLDR-
ING & L.W. MAHER, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW IN AUSTRALIA 213 (2d ed. 1983). 
197. H.V. EMY, supra note 173, at 47-48, 87-88. This was the legislation that was challenged 
unsuccessfully in New South Wales v. Commonwealth (1975), 135 C.L.R. 337, discussed supra notes 
50-61 and accompanying text. See also Head, supra note 155, at 82. 
198. H.V. EMY, supra note 173, at 21, 88-89. 
199. Boyce, The Politics and Diplomacy of Torres Strait Negotiations, in THE TORRES STRAIT TREATY: A 
SYMPOSIUM 5-14 (P.J. Boyce & M.D. Whit~ eds. 1981). 
200. See New South Wales v. Commonwealth, (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337, 503 (Murphy, J.). 
201. See generally 1974 I UNIFORM LAB. REv. 64. 
202. Id. 
312 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VIII, No.2 
the ground that "federal clauses were discriminatory in that they resulted in 
lesser obligations being imposed on federal States than on unitary States."203 
The states were strongly opposed to such moves by the federal government. 
They won greater victories, however, on the political front than on the legal 
front with respect to the federal government's exploitation of the external affairs 
power. One interesting response to the federal action was the establishment of 
the Queensland Treaties Commission in November 1974.204 The purpose of 
establishing the Commission was to assert Queensland's interest in the im-
plementation of treaties affecting Queensland, and that Queensland should have 
the right to pass the implementing legislation.205 Apart from the production of 
two reports (in 1976 and 1977)206 and the political flourish accompanying its 
establishment, the Commission has not had a significant impact. 
In addition to these important and controversial developments in the area of 
foreign affairs, there were also advances that were achieved as a result of 
cooperation with the states. For example, the government ratified nine ILO 
Conventions in three years,207 including the Convention on Discrimination in 
Occupation and Employment (No. 111).208 There had been consultations be-
tween the federal and state authorities prior to Labor's coming to power in 
relation to this Convention. All the states agreed to ratify the Convention and to 
participate in a cooperative federal/state administrative scheme to implement 
it. 209 This arrangement has worked relatively well in practice. 2lO 
Thus, it can be seen that the Whitlam government was committed to an 
expansive view of the external affairs power where it was the most effective or 
appropriate way to achieve a desired policy, while continuing to pursue coopera-
203. REPORT OF THE AUSTRALIAN DELECATION TO THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON WILLS (1975), 
Parliamentary Paper No. 317, 1974, para. 53. See also Nadelmann, The Formal Validity of Wills and the 
Washington Convention 1973 Providing the Form of an International Will, 22 AM. J. COMPo L. 365,373-74 
(1974). The Conference rejected this view and adopted the federal clause proposed by Canada. 
204. Treaties Commission Act 1974 (Qld). 
205. 1974-75 AUSTL. Y.B. INT·L. L. 341-43. 
206. See Crawford & Edeson, International Law and Australian Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN Au-
STRALIA 101, 102 (K.W. Ryan 2d ed. 1984). 
207. No. 81, 54 U.N.T.S. 3; No. 83, _ U.N.T.S. _; No. 86,161 V.N.T.S. ll3; No. 87, 68 V.N.T.S. 
17; No. 98,96 V.N.T.S 257; No. 100, 165 V.N.T.S. 303; No. 111,362 V.N.T.S. 31; No. 131,825 
V.N.T.S. 77; No. 137,976 V.N.T.S. No. 1-14156.125 AUSTL. PARL. DEB., H.R. 2927-31 (1981) (reply by 
the Minister for Industrial Relations to Question on Notice No. 2713). 
208. 362 V.N.T.S. 31. 
209. Statement by the Minister for Labour, Mr. Cameron, May 22,1973,84 AUSTL. PARL. DEB., H.R., 
2371-80. See also ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
ANn OCCUPATION 1976-77, Parliamentary Paper No. 158 (1978). 
210. There has, however, been concern that state anti-discrimination legislation introduced since 
1975 is likely to lead to conflicting jurisdiction and uncertainty, and that the legislation may not be 
entirely consistent with the Convention. See National Committee on Discrimination in Em ployment and 
Occupation, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT, Parliamentary Paper No. 158 (1978). This concern was not 
repeated in the Committee's EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT 1980-81, Parliamentary Paper No.5 (1982), but 
there have been jurisdictional conflicts, see infra text accompanying notes 233-238. 
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tion with the states in certain areas where cooperative action seemed both 
possible and desirable. At the same time, the external affairs power was the 
government's vehicle for the expression of a strong commitment to national 
policies of development, conservation, and human rights. 
3. 1975-83: The Fraser Years 
The defeat of the Labor government In the 1975 election brought about a 
reversion to the practice previously adopted in relation to treaty ratification and 
implementation. The Liberal-National Party government proved its commit-
ment to cooperate with the states by returning some control over offshore areas 
to the states. 211 This effectively reversed the outcome of the Seas and Submerged 
Lands case. 212 The government took similar action in relation to the ratification of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 213 The issue of ratifica-
tion was referred to the Meeting of Ministers on Human Rights, from which it 
emerged in 1980 accompanied by a number of interpretive declarations, reserva-
tions, and other statements, all of which raised real doubts about the strength of 
the Liberal-National Party government's commitment to the principles of the 
Covenant. 214 
Perhaps the clearest indication of the Fraser government's attitude to the 
states in the area of foreign affairs was the agreement reached between the 
federal government and the states at the Premiers' Conference in October 1977. 
At the Conference, the parties agreed to five points: first, that the states must be 
told in all cases, and at an early stage, of any treaty discussion that Australia has 
decided to join; second, that the Commonwealth would be firmly committed to 
consultation with the states before deciding whether to adopt or implement a 
treaty which affects a legislative area traditionally regarded as being within the 
responsibility of the states; third, that the states would be given the first option of 
legislating to implement any treaty provisions if within an area of state power; 
fourth, that representatives of the states would be included in delegations to 
international conferences which deal with state subjects, so that the states could 
advise the Commonwealth negotiators of any impact a treaty might have upon 
the state; and fifth, that federal clauses would be included in treaties in appro-
priate cases. 215 
The Fraser years were characterized by little assertion by the Commonwealth 
211. Bjelke-Petersen, A View from Queensland, in AUSTRALlAN FEDERALlSM: FUTURE TENSE 64 (A. 
Patience &J. Scott eds. 1983); Lumb, Australian CoastalJurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRAI.JA 
(K.W. Ryan 2d ed. 1984) 370, 370-74, 381-86. 
212. (1975) 135 C.L.R. 337; see supra text accompanying notes 50-61. 
213. 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
214. See generally Triggs, Australia's Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Endorsement or Repudiation?, 31 INT'L & COMPo L.Q. 278 (1982). 
215. See Burmester, supra note 27, at 281. Cf. Triggs, supra note 214, at 291. 
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of its external affairs power, and by a greater degree of cooperation with the 
states generally. One interesting result of the commitment to cooperating with 
the states was the Australian proposal to insert a federal clause in the U.N. Draft 
Convention on Torture.216 
Another result of the return to conservative government was the return to a 
state of quiescence with respect to the ratification of ILO conventions. In the 
period 1976-81 the International Labour Conference adopted thirteen new 
Conventions; the Australian delegation voted in favor of all but one of these. By 
1983 only one of these had been ratified. 217 Other Conventions seemed to 
disappear into the quagmire of federaVstate consultations, from which they still 
had not emerged almost a decade later. 218 
4. 1983-: The Hawke Labor Government 
The election of the Hawke Labor government in March 1983 has had impor-
tant consequences for the use of the external affairs power. The new Labor 
government came to power with clear commitments to stop the construction of 
the Franklin Dam,219 to enact an Australian Bill of Rights based on the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,220 and to implement the U.N. 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women.221 
The Hawke government achieved its first success in stopping the construction 
of the Franklin Dam in the Tasmanian Dams case.222 Its next success came when 
the Women's Discrimination Convention was ratified on July 28, 1983, and 
implementing legislation entered into force on August 1, 1984.223 The govern-
ment prepared a draft Australian Bill of Rights based on the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but this initiative has faltered somewhat 
in the face of political pressure from some states, and from a lack of a general 
commitment on the part of the Hawke government to enact a Bill of Rights. 224 
216. U.N. Doc. ElCN.411983/63. 
217. Only the Tripartite Consultation (International Labour Standards) Convention 1976 (No. 144) 
had been ratified by the Fraser government between 1975 and 1983. 125 AUSTL. PARL. DEB., H.R., 
2927, at 2931 (1981) (reply by the Minister for Industrial Relations to Question on Notice 2713). 
218. See, e.g., Workers' Representatives Convention 1971 (No. 135) 883 U.N .T.S. 111; Rural Work-
ers' Organizations Convention 1975 (No. 141); 125 AUSTL. PARL. DEB. H.R., 2932, November 17, 1981. 
219. See supra notes 95-145 and accompanying text. 
220. 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
221. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Dec. 18, 
1979 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981), GA. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/341180 (1980). 
222. (1983) 57 Aust!. LJ.R. 450; see supra text accompanying notes 95-145. 
223. Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). A number of reservations to the Women's Discrimination 
Convention were entered (concerning combat-related military duties and universal paid maternity 
leave). UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARy-GENERAL, SUPPLE-
MENT: ACTIONS FROM 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 1983, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER. El2/ADD. 1, IV, 
8-1. 
224. A federal Bill of Rights was drafted by early 1984, but political pressure from Queensland and 
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On the international level, the Hawke government withdrew the Australian 
proposa!225 to insert a federal clause in the U.N. Draft Convention on Torture226 
and has withdrawn ten of the thirteen reservations and declarations attached to 
Australia's ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 227 It has also declared its reluctance to enter reservations when ratifying 
multilateral treaties,228 although at the same time it has included "statements" of 
Tasmania succeeded in delaying the introduction of the legislation until after the federal election then 
anticipated for late 1984. Apparently, Labor Ministers were concerned that attacks by the states on the 
issue would be politically disadvantageous. The Age (Melbourne), Mar. 22, 1984, at 6. The Labor 
government was returned with a decreased majority in the election held in December 1984, but the 
Attorney-General, Senator Evans, who was strongly committed to the enactment of the Bill of Rights, 
was transferred to another portfolio and replaced by the Deputy Prime Minister, Lionel Bowen, who 
has expressed doubts as to whether the Bill should proceed. The Sydney Morning Herald, Dec. 10, 
1983, at 3. Mr. Bowen announced in June 1985 that he would introduce a federal Human Rights Bill 
into Parliament in the session beginning in August 1985. The Bill will relate to the acts and practices of 
the federal government and its agencies and will not apply to the states. 
225. Information supplied by the Australian Mission to the United Nations, July 1984. 
226. See supra note 216. 
227. By instrument dated Oct. 20, 1984, and subsequently deposited with the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations, Australia withdrew all of its reservations and declarations to the Covenant with 
three exceptions, namely, its reservations to Articles 10, 14, and 20. At the same time, a "statement" of 
Australia's Federal Constitutional System was also deposited, in identical terms to the statement 
described infra note 229. 
228. Human Rights and International Law, Address by the Attorney-General, Senator Evans, to the 
International Law Association (Australian Branch), April 12, 1984, reported in [1984] AUSTL. INT'L LAW 
NEWS 133, 140. 
The position adopted by the Hawke government in relation to federal clauses is set out in a document 
entitled Principles and Procedures for Commonwealth-State Consultation on Treaties endorsed by the Com-
monwealth and followed since 1983. The relevant section of that document provides: 
FEDERAL STATE ASPECTS 
i) The Government does not favor the inclusion of federal clauses in treaties and does not 
intend to instruct Australian delegations to seek such inclusion. The pursuit of federal clauses 
in treaties is generally seen by the international community as an attempt by the Federal State 
to avoid the full obligations of a party to the treaty. Experience at a number of International 
Conferences has shown that such clauses are regarded with disfavor by almost the entire 
international community. Experience has also shown that a Federal clause tailored to the needs 
of one federation will be unacceptable to other federations. Instructing an Australian Delega-
tion to press for a federal clause only diverts its resources from more important tasks. 
ii) The Government sees no objection to Australia making unilaterally a short 'Federal State-
ment' on sig,!ing or ratifying certain appropriate treaties, provided that such a statement 
clearly does not affect Australia's obligations as a party. An 'appropriate' treaty would be one 
where it is intended that the States will playa role in its implementation. An appropriate form 
for such a statement acceptable to most States and the Commonwealth, is attached. 
iii) The normal practice is that Australia does not become a party to a treaty containing a 
federal clause until the laws of all States are brought into line with the mandatory provisions of 
the treaty. However, where a suitable 'territorial units' federal clause is included in a treaty, the 
possibility of Australia acceding only in respect of those States which wish to adopt the treaty 
might be considered on a case by case basis where appropriate, perhaps in some private law 
treaties. 
iv) The Commonwealth will consider relying on State legislation where the treaty affects an 
area of particular concern to the States and this course is consistent with the national interest 
and the effective and timely discharge of treaty obligations. However the Government does not 
accept that it is appropriate for the Commonwealth to commit itself in a general way not to 
legislate in areas that are constitutionally subject to Commonwealth power. 
FEDERAL STATEMENT 
Australia has a federal constitutional system in which legislative, executive and judicial 
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Australia's federal constitutional system in its instrument of ratification of a 
number of treaties in order to pacify state interests.229 
The Hawke government's attitude toward the use of the external affairs power 
is at least outwardly more conciliatory than that of the Whitlam government 
towards the states, at least with respect to giving the states an opportunity to 
pursue the implementation of treaties at the state level. Nonetheless, the gov-
ernment is committed to attaining acceptable standards of human rights for all 
Australians. Because some states do not share this view, however, the govern-
ment has been forced to enact federal legislation in the area of sex discrimina-
tion. At the same time, it realizes that efficient administration and political 
realities may make it more expedient for it not to attempt to occupy the whole 
field. The former Attorney-General, Senator Evans, recognizing this limitation, 
has stated: 
There is ample scope for the States to enact human rights legislation, 
both in their own right and to reinforce or complement Common-
wealth action. The Government's policy is that federal measures 
should not infringe upon constructive developments which have 
been taking place in some States in the human rights field and which 
are consistent with our international obligations; it is important for 
the Commonwealth - both as the national government and as 
Australia's international face - to be the standard bearer in human 
rights matters, to be able to fill in the vacuums in State law, where 
they exist, and to supplement the weaknesses in that law where these 
are manifest. But it is neither necessary nor desirable for the Com-
monwealth to try and cover the whole field itself. 23o 
The discussion above indicates that the affirmation of a broad power of treaty 
powers are shared or distributed between the Commonwealth and the constituent States. 
The implementation of the treaty throughout Australia will be effected by the Common-
wealth, State and Territory authorities having regard to their respective constitutional powers 
and arrangements concerning their exercise. 
AUSTRALIAN PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1981-1983 O. Brown ed. 1985), unpublished mimeog-
raph, 288-89. 
229. Two recent examples are the Women's Discrimination Convention, see supra note 221, and the 
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
1978. 
UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARy-GENERAL, SUPPLEMENT: 
ACTIONS FROM I JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 1983, IV. 8-2 (1984). See also INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
ORGANIZATION, STATUS OF MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION OR ITS SECRETARy-GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITARY OR OTHER 
FUNCTIONS 189 (1984) (ratifications as of December 31, 1983). Australia ratified these conventions on 
July 28,1983, and November 7,1983, respectively. The federal statements were in terms identical to the 
statement referred to in note 228 supra. 
230. Paper presented by the Attorney-General, Sen. Gareth Evans, to the Australian Legal Conven-
tion, Brisbane, July 7, 1983, at 16. The same commitment to working where possible with and through 
the states is also reflected in the speech of Prime Minister Hawke to the International Labour Confer-
ence, Geneva, June 10, 1983, reprinted in 54 AUSTL. FOREIGN AFF. REC. 262-65 (june 1983). 
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implementation in the Dams case is unlikely to produce a sharp break with 
previous practice. The Labor government will likely use its power in the area of 
human rights legislation and in other areas, such as environmental conservation, 
where it is strongly committed to a particular policy. On the other hand, the 
more conciliatory approach taken by the new government in relation to coopera-
tion with the states, as well as the perceived efficiency of utilizing available state 
administrative resources to achieve effective implementation of particular 
treaties, will mean that consultation with the states about the entry into and 
ratification of treaties encroaching upon their traditional areas of power will 
continue to be important in many cases. 
One other important result of the confirmation of a federal external affairs 
power is its increased value as a bargaining chip in federal/state relations. The 
implications of the existence of a federal power to implement the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (and other human rights instruments) are 
extremely important as virtually every area of life can be construed as being 
within the range of operation of these documents. The possibility of resort to the 
external affairs power may prove to be an important weapon in the Common-
wealth's armory when negotiating with the states on any number of matters. The 
states, eager to preserve a certain amount of autonomy, may be more prepared 
to agree to implement a treaty by means of state laws if they realize that failure to 
do so would mean that the federal government will act on its own. 
Another area in which this bargaining chip may have ramifications is the 
unification and harmonization of law throughout Australia. The track record of 
unification of law in Australia has been one of only limited success, with uniform 
hire-purchase statutes and uniform companies and securities laws being the 
major achievements. 231 The major body concerned with this issue at the political 
level is the Standing Committee of Commonwealth and State Attorneys-
General.232 This Standing Committee has been plagued in its attempts to pursue 
uniform laws by an unwillingness on the part of some of its members to take 
political risks or to surrender state sovereignty, as well as by the extremely slow 
progress of matters referred to it. 
VI. THE INFLUENCE OF FEDERALISM ON AUSTRALIA'S TREATY PRACTICE 
A. Federal States and International Law 
The impact of federalism on the international order has been the subject of 
considerable literature. 233 The performance of federal states in ratifying the 
231. See generally Kirby, Uniform Law Reform: Will We Live to See It? 8 SYDNEY L. REV. 1-14 (1977); 
Goldring, Unification and Harmonization of the Rules of Law, 9 FED. L. REV. 284 (1978). 
232. The Standing Committee of Commonwealth and State Attorneys-General was founded in 1965. 
233. See. e.g .• 1. BERNIER. supra note 24. For leading treatises on the subject, see L. WILDHABER. supra 
note 166, TREATy-MAKING POWER AND CONSTITUTION (1971); R. GHOSH. TREATIES AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONS (1961). 
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International Labour Organisation Conventions and other human rights in-
struments has received particular attention.234 
Compared to unitary states, federal states such as Australia, Canada, and the 
United States have a poor track record in ratifying these types ofinstruments. 235 
Moreover, federal states in which the central government has a broad power to 
implement treaties do not necessarily ratify a greater number of such conven-
tions than federal states with a more restricted central power.236 Finally, federal 
states have tended to appeal to the demands of federalism to justify their failure 
to ratify conventions, to excuse delays in ratifying, and to support their attempts 
to insert federal clauses in multilateral instruments.237 
There are a number of grounds on which the behavior of these federal states 
has been extensively criticized. First, the central government may misrepresent 
the extent of its power to implement treaties, thereby concealing an unwilling-
ness to assume a particular obligation or to submit generally to the requirements 
of the international order.238 Second, a federal state's reliance upon the insertion 
of federal clauses in multilateral treaties creates an inequality of obligation 
between federal and unitary states, because the federal state derives the benefit 
of appearing to undertake a substantial obligation while in fact not doing SO.239 
Third, the actual and alleged demands of federalism have a retarding effect on 
the development and implementation of international standards. 24o 
One can identify at least two major strands in the critique of the role of federal 
states. The first is the moral condemnation of the duplicity involved in relying on 
the alleged demands of federalism to assume lesser commitments at the interna-
tional level when the real reason is a lack of substantive agreement with the 
policies of a convention. The second major strand is the view that there is 
something inherent in a federal system (or at least in certain types of federal 
systems) that seriously impedes progress towards uniform standards at the 
international level. 241 
234. E.g., I. BERNIER, supra note 24 at 162-63, 175-77; Looper, supra note 163; Charlesworth, supra 
note 75. ch. 2. 
235. See supra note 234. 
236. I. BERNIER, supra note 24, at 152-71. 
237. Id. at 152-71, 172-87. 
238. See, e.g., Looper, supra note 163, at 169; Charlesworth, supra note 75 at 21, 22, 61. 
239. See, e.g., Charlesworth, supra note 75, at 37-38; Looper, supra note 163, at 170, 173-75. This 
disparity may have more than a mere symbolic impact. Concern that federal states might gain a 
competitive advantage over unitary states due to the more onerous obligations imposed on unitary 
states was a contributing factor in the revision of the I.L.O. Constitution in 1946. Looper, supra, at 179. 
240. See, e.g., Sorensen, supra note 72, at 201; Charlesworth, supra note 75, at 76-77. 
241. There is a third strand, somewhat opposed to the second, which asserts that the problems 
experienced by federal states in ratifying treaties are essentially political and that other states also 
experience political problems that differ only in degree; accordingly, no special concessions should be 
made to federal states. See, e.g., Riesmann, The American Constitution and International Labour Legislation, 
44 INT'L LAB. REV. 123, 192-93 (1941); Looper, supra note 163, at 202-03. 
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Previous discussion of federal state participation in ILO Conventions has 
tended to focus on the low number of ratifications by federal states in compari-
son with similarly situated unitary states, and on the advantage taken of the ILO 
federal clause to reduce the extent of obligations incurred. From these facts, it 
has been concluded that federalism is the primary culprit in explaining this 
unimpressive record.242 
This conclusion, however, fails to take into account that factors other than 
those related to federalism may have just as great an influence on the behavior of 
federal states in this area. Moreover, one must be cautious in comparing "simi-
larly situated" unitary states, as the social and political history of each such state 
may make such a comparison deceptive. This is not to say, however, that the 
conclusions reached by previous writers are not in large measure correct; rather, 
the concentration on federal factors may have merely obscured other influences 
that have been just as significant. 
This emphasis on federal factors has resulted in the conflation of two possible 
avenues of attack on the performance of federal states. The first is criticism of 
the pretextual use of federalism and the institutional drawbacks of federalism 
for the international order; clearly this is available only against federal states. 
The secOIid is criticism of a country for its failure to support symbolically and 
practically the development of international standards which, it is believed, will 
contribute to a greater level of social justice throughout the world; this argument 
can be made against any state. It is against this background that Australia's 
performance in the international forum will be discussed. 
B. Australia and the International Labour Organisation 
While the discussion above showed that governments of different political 
persuasions have had varying commitments to the use of the external affairs 
power and to the policies pursued by the ILO,243 there has been a relatively 
consistent procedural approach adopted by Australian governments in relation 
242. In the Australian context little new analysis of l.L.O. ratifications has been done since the 
publication of the study by G. DOEKER, supra note 166, which deals with the question primarily from a 
descriptive point of view. The other major contributions have been Bailey, Australia and the Intematinnal 
Labour Conventions, 54 INT'L LAB. REv. 285 (1946), and J .G. Starke, Australia and the International Labour 
Organization, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 115 (D.P. O'Connell ed. 1965). Examination of 
Australia's .record from the 1960s until the present has been sporadic, due in large part to the lack of 
readily accessible comprehensive material. The last comprehensive review published by the Australian 
government was the REVIEW OF AUSTRALIAN LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO CONVENTIONS ADOPTED 
BY THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE (1969), Parliamentary Paper No. 197, 1969 [hereinafter 
cited as 1969 REVIEW). As of August 1983, the new Labor government was undertaking a new review of 
Australia's position. See AUSTL. PARL. DEB., H.R., WEEKLY HANSARD, August 23, 1983, at 92-93 (reply by 
the Minister for Industrial Relations to QUestiO., on Notice No. 94). As of June 1985 the report of the 
review had not yet been published. 
243. See text accompanying notes 154-230. 
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to ratification of Conventions since the early days of the ILO.244 Even the 
Whitlam government of 1972-75, committed as it was to the ratification of ILO 
Conventions, chose to follow the well-trodden path of consultation with the 
states.245 
The stated policy of the federal government has been to refer to the states' 
Conventions dealing with matters that affect areas of traditional state compe-
tence, and to ratify a Convention only if all states formally agree to ratification 
(and if law and practice in all Australian jurisdictions are in accordance with the 
provisions of the Convention).246 This practice has been justified by reference to 
the limited nature of the external affairs power, but a deference to state auton-
omy, disagreement with or indifference to the policies embodied in particular 
Conventions, political and bureaucratic inertia at both the federal and state level, 
and the organizational difficulties of coordinating the consultative process must 
be the real reasons behind Australia's record of delay and non-ratification. 
Statistics tell part of the story. As of December 1981, the numbers of Conven-
tions ratified by the following countries (out of a total of 158 Conventions 
adopted by the International Conference) were: (See Table 1)247 
TABLE I 
NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS 
RATIFIED BY SELECTED STATES 
Federal State 
United Kingdom 





United States of America 
(AS OF DECEMBER 1981) 









Delay, often inordinate, has characterized Australia's pattern of ratification (See 
Table II).248 
244. See generally Bailey, supra note 242; G. DOEKER, supra note 166, at 231-41. 
245. De Stoop, Australia's Approach' to International Treaties on Human Rights, 1970-73 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L 
L. 27, 35. 
246. 1969 REVIEW, supra note 242, at 7. 
247. These figures, contained in Table I, are based on information contained in the International 
Labour Office, LIST OF RATIFICATIONS OF CONVENTIONS (1982), International Labour Conference, 68th 
Session 1982, REPORT III (Pt. 5) [hereinafter cited as I.L.O. LIST 1982] (ratifications as of Dec. 31, 1981). 
The texts of 146 of the 158 Conventions adopted by the International Labour Conference up to 1983 
appear in the collection of I. he International Labour Office, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1919-1981 (1982). 
248. This delay is graphically displayed in Table II. See I.L.O. LIST 1982, supra note 247. See also 125 
AUSTL. PARL. DEB., H.R., 2927-31 (1981) (reply by the Minister for Industrial Relations to Question on 
Notice No. 2713). 
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TABLE II 
PERIOD BETWEEN ADOPTION OF CONVENTION AND 


















Recent experience shows that the pattern demonstrated by these figures is not 
distorted by the inclusion of Conventions of considerable age that have become 
obsolete. In the period 1972-81, the Australian delegation to the International 
Labour Conference voted in favor of eighteen of the twenty Conventions 
adopted by the Conference. By the end of 1984, only two of those eighteen 
Conventions had been ratified. No Australian state had agreed to the ratification 
of fifteen of the Conventions, all states but one (the Northern Territory) had 
agreed to the ratification of the Human Resources Development Convention 
1975 (No. 142)249 and the Labour Administration Convention 1978 (No. 150),250 
and Western Australia alone had agreed to the ratification of the Labour Rela-
tions (Public Service) Convention 1978 (No. 151).251 
The citation of statistics does not of itself explain all the reasons for Australia's 
performance; to do this it is necessary to examine the progress of individual 
conventions. In 1969, the Australian government produced a report summariz-
ing the current Australian position in relation to the Conventions adopted up to 
1968.252 The report set forth six explanations for Australia's modest record of 
ratification: 
(1) the inapplicability or limited relevance of some Conventions to Australian 
conditions (and the implicit position that the effort required to bring Australian 
law into line with the Convention would be too great and would serve no useful 
purpose);253 (2) the fact that a number of Conventions were no longer open to 
ratification, having been superseded by later Conventions which had come into 
force;254 (3) the non-conformity of law and practice in some jurisdictions with the 
249. No. 142, 1050 U.N.T.S. 1-1582. 
250. No. 150, _ U.N.T.S. _. 
251. No. 151, _ U.N.T.S. _. See 125 AUSTL. PARL. DEB., H.R., 2827-28, 2927-31 (1981) (reply by the 
Minister for Industrial Relations to Questions on Notice Nos. 2714 and 2713, respectively). By the end 
of 1981, the United Kingdom had ratified eight of these Conventions; the Federal Republic of 
Germany, eight; Austria, three; and New Zealand, one. I.L.O. LIST 1982, supra note 247. 
252. See generally 1969 REVIEW, supra note 242. 
253. /d. at 9. 
254. /d. 
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provisions of particular Conventions (and the implication that no steps would be 
taken to remedy the position);255 (4) the observance in Australia of standards 
equivalent to but different from those required by particular Conventions;256 (5) 
the failure of one or more states to agree to ratification;257 and (6) the opposition 
of the federal government or of state governments to important provisions of 
Conventions.258 
In the case of many Conventions more than one of these excuses is proffered, 
and it is difficult to know what the relative influence of federal and non-federal 
factors has been. In a number of cases there is a relatively clear disagreement 
with the policies or coverage of a particular Convention and no concealment of 
this fact behind the excuse of lack of agreement by the states.259 A variation of 
this occurs where there is substantial conformity between the Australian position 
and the Convention, but particular aspects of the Convention are not acceptable 
or cannot be complied with without a great deal of trouble. 260 
The use of federalism as a smokescreen, and its effect as an institutional brake, 
can also be seen at work, although it can be difficult on occasion to disentangle it 
from indifference to or disagreement with the provisions of particular Conven-
tions. For example, in the case of the Abolition of Penal Sanctions (Indigenous 
Workers) Convention 1955 (No. 104),261 provisions in legislation contrary to the 
Convention were described as being no longer applicable in practice and "the 
possibility of removing them has been taken up with the States."262 The Conven-
tion had still not been ratified fifteen years later in 1984. The ratification of the 
Accommodation of Crews Convention 1949 (Revised) (No. 92)263 required 
amendments to New South Wales legislation264 and the Imperial Merchant 
Shipping Act265 to permit ratification. 266 A two to three year wait seemed likely in 
1969, but by 1984 the Convention still had not been ratified. 
The Report's analysis of the position of the Medical Examination of Young 
255. ld. at 8. 
256. ld. 
257. See, e.g., id. at 17, 19,21. 
258. See, e.g., id. at 39, 51, 61. 
259. See, e.g., Holidays with Pay (Agriculture) Convention 1952 I.L.O. No. 101, 196 V.N.T.S. 183, 
1969 REVIEW, supra note 242, at 91; Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention 1962 I.L.O. No. 
118,494 V.N .T.S. 271, 1969 REVIEW, supra note 242, at 105; Guarding of Machinery Convention 1963 
I.L.O. No. 119,532 V.N.T.S. 159, 1969 REVIEW, supra note 242, at 106; Hygiene (Commerce and 
Offices) Convention 1964 I.L.O. No. 120,560 V.N.T.S. 201, 1969 REVIEW, supra note 242, at 107. 
260. E.g., Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention 19691.L.O. No. 129,812 V.N.T.S. 87; 1969 
REVIEW, supra note 242, at 109. 
261. 305 V.N.T.S. 265. 
262. 1969 REVIEW, supra note 242, at 94. 
263. 160 V.N.T.S. 223. 
264. Navigation Act 1901 (N.S.W.). 
265. Merchant Shipping Act 1894 (V.K.). 
266. 1969 REVIEW, supra note 242, at 83. 
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Persons (Underground Work) Convention 1964 (No. 124)267 is revealing. In 
1969 the Convention was fully implemented only in the federal territories and 
Western Australia. In New South Wales, Queensland, and Tasmania some 
provision was made for medical examination of young workers but the program 
did not conform with the requirements of the Convention. In Victoria and South 
Australia, where the Convention was of limited applicability, no such provision 
was made. The report concluded that the "ratification of the Convention is not 
practicable but the possibility of giving full effect to it has been raised with the 
States."268 
Particularly interesting was the fate of a number of Conventions the subject 
matter of which came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal govern-
ment. Of the nine Conventions within Commonwealth jurisdiction that had not 
been ratified by 1969, only two had been ratified by the end of 1984.269 The 
progress of the other Conventions is quite revealing. For example, neither the 
Invalidity, Old-Age and Survivors' Benefits Convention 1967 (No. 128),270 nor 
the Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention 1958 (No. 108)271 were ratified. 
The subject matter of both Conventions was described in 1969 as being within 
exclusive federal jurisdiction,272 yet the responsible Minister in 1981 explained 
that the reason for non-ratification was simply that no state had agreed to it.273 In 
1969, the government had stated that ,the Australian system of benefits was 
"substantially in accord with the provisions of the [Invalidity, Old-Age and 
Survivors' Benefits Convention),"274 and the possibility of ratifying the Conven-
tion was "under close examination."275 The explanation more than a decade later 
that, although the subject matter of the Convention is an exclusively federal 
matter, the states have not agreed to ratification and therefore the federal 
government is unable to ratify is hardly a convincing one.276 The answer must lie 
elsewhere, either in bureaucratic inertia, political indifference to the policies of 
the Convention, or in some other factor concealed behind the purported re-
quirements of the federal compact. 
The progress of the Social Policy (Non-Metropolitan Territories) Convention 
267, 614 U.N.T.S, 239, 
268. 1969 REVIEW, supra note 242, at Ill. 
269. The two Conventions that were ratified were the Unemployment Convention 1919, I.L.D, No. 
2,38 U,N.T.S. 41 (ratified June 15, 1972), and the Labour Standards (Non-Metropolitan Territories) 
Convention 1947 I.L.D. No. 83, 943 U.N.T.S. 104 (ratified June 15, 1973). 
270. 699 U,N.T.S. 185. 
271. 389 U.N.T.S. 277. 
272. 1969 REVIEW, supra note 242, at 9. 
273. 125 AUSTL. PARL. DEB., H.R., 2927 (1981) (reply by the Minister for Industrial Relations to 
Question on Notice No. 2713). A similar explanation was offered in the case of the Migration for 
Employment Convention 1949 (Revised), I.L.D. No. 97,120 U,N.T.S. 71, the subject matter of which 
was also described in 1969 as being within exclusive federal jurisdiction. Id. 
274. 1969 REVIEW, supra note 242, at 115. 
275. Id. 
276. 125 AUSTL PARL. DEB., H.R., 2927, 2930-31 (1981), 
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1947 (No. 82)277 sheds some interesting light on the strength of Australia's 
commitment to that Convention. The 1969 Report declared that "Australian 
policies in its non-metropolitan territories are generally in line with the provi-
sions of the Convention"278 - the major impediment to ratification was the 
position in Papua New Guinea.279 Papua New Guinea became independent in 
1975, but the Convention had still not been ratified by 1984. The only explana-
tion given in 1969 was the existence of "a possible difficulty in regard to the 
provision which requires the abolition of discriminatory wage rates by applica-
tion of the principle of equal remuneration for work of equal value" to the same 
extent as in the metropolitan territory.28o The exact nature of this difficulty was 
not elaborated upon, nor was any further explanation given in 1981 for the 
continuing failure to ratify. 
Apart from these cases, it is clear that on a number of occasions states have 
been extremely slow to respond to federal initiatives and that the federal gov-
ernment has been less than vigorous in pursuing the states. One recent example 
is the action taken in relation to the Labour Relations (Public Service) Conven-
tion 1978 (No. 151).281 The Convention has fairly modest aims, namely to ensure 
the existence of independent industrial organizations of public employees, to 
protect union members and representatives against discrimination on the 
ground of their connection with the union, and to guarantee the rights of 
freedom of association of public employees. In 1978, the federal government 
requested detailed information from the states on the extent to which law and 
practice in each jurisdiction complied with the Convention.282 This should have 
277. No. 82, 214 V.N.T.S. 345. 
278. 1969 REVIEW, supra note 242, at 75. 
279. /d. 
280. Id. The fate of neglect or disinterest also seems to have befallen the Social Security (Minimum 
Standards) Convention 1952 I.L.O. No. 102,210 V.N.T.S. 131, which covers nine branches of social 
security, most of which are within exclusive federal jurisdiction. Ratification of the Convention is 
permissible in respect of any three or more branches. In 1969 the Commonwealth was "reexamining the 
possibility of ratification in respect of several of the branches," id. at 93, but the Convention was still 
unratified in 1984. The explanation given in 1981 was that no state had agreed to ratification. 125 
AUSTL. PARL. DEB., H.R., 2927, 2929 (1981) (reply by the Minister for Industrial Relations to Question 
on Notice No. 2713). 
The Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention 1962 I.L.O. No. 118,494 V.N.T.S. 271, 
dealing with the same branches of social security, may be ratified in respect of anyone or more branch, 
in order that the principle of equality of treatment be applied in as many countries as possible. 
International Labour Conference, Equality of Treatment (Social Security) 8-9 (1977), General Survey 
by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 63d Session 
1977. The Committee of Experts was of the view that Australian legislation would permit Australia to 
ratify the Convention in respect of four of the nine branches, id. at 68, 71, but the Convention remains 
unratified even in part, once again on the basis that not all states have agreed to ratification. 125 AUSTI .. 
PARL. DEB., H.R., 2927 (1981) (reply by the Minister for Industrial Relations to Question on Notice No. 
2713). 
281. _ V.N.T.S. _. 
282. 125 AUSTL. PARL. DEB., H.R., 2932 (1981) (reply by the Minister for Industrial Relations to 
Question on Notice No. 2948). 
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been a relatively simple task, yet as of 1982 these responses had not been 
received (despite five occasions on which the Convention has been discussed at 
federaVstate meetings).283 
Similarly, in 1969, the only bar to the ratification of the Minimum Age (Sea) 
Convention 1936 (Revised) (No. 58)284 was that the law of New South Wales 
required the master of a ship to keep a list of only some young persons under the 
age of sixteen employed in their vessels, and not of all such persons (as was 
required by the Convention). At that time, New South Wales authorities were 
examining the state's legislation "with a view to making such amendments as are 
necessary to comply with the Convention."285 The Convention, however, is still 
unratified. 
This brief examination of a number of unratified Conventions enables one to 
identify a number of factors that may be at work: disagreement with the policies 
embodied in a Convention (this may be associated with or concealed behind the 
excuse of lack of state agreement); the retarding effect of having to consult with 
the states even when the federal government is strongly committed to a particu-
lar Convention; bureaucratic inertia; or lack of resources at federal or state level. 
Australia's record of ratification of ILO Conventions may be summarized as 
follows: 
l. The federal government has on a number of occasions ex-
plained its non-ratification of a Convention by reference to the 
necessity for unanimous state consent when there was no legal or 
practical necessity for waiting for the states to agree, as the subject 
matter of the Convention was within exclusive federaljurisdiction. 286 
2. Lack of agreement by the states has been used by the federal 
government to explain its failure to ratify a Convention in cases in 
which the real reason for that failure is the government's opposition 
or indifference to the content of a particular Convention (in many 
cases shared by state governments); generally in such cases, the 
federal government has failed to pursue the states diligently when 
their responses have been slow or not forthcoming, and has readily 
accepted minor inconsistencies between Australian law and the pro-
visions of a Convention as sufficient to bar ratification. 287 
3. Non-ratification of a number of Conventions can be, and has 
been, explained justifiably on the ground that the approaches 
adopted by the Conventions are not readily adaptable to established 
283. /d. 
284. 40 U.N.T.S. 205. 
285. 1969 REVIEW, supra note 242, at 57. 
286. E.g., Conventions No. 92,160 U.N.T.S. 223; No. 102,210 U.N.T.S. 131; No. 108,389 U.N.T.S. 
277; No. 118,494 U.N.T.S. 271; No. 128,699 U.N.T.S. 185. 
287. E.g., Conventions No. 58,40 U.N.T.S. 205 and No. 151, _ U.N.T.S. _ and possibly also No. 
142, 1050 U.N.T.S. 1-15823 and No. 150, _ U.N.T.S. _. 
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Australian institutions, and ratification would therefore not be pos-
sible without fundamental changes to the Australian system.288 
4. Non-ratification of a number of Conventions has been jus-
tifiably explained on the ground that they have no application to 
Australian conditions.289 
5. The federal government has on a number of occasions admit-
ted that the reason for non-ratification of a number of conventions 
was its own opposition to the content of the Convention.290 
6. The procedure of consultation with the states has been slow 
and cumbersome in most cases, resulting in inordinately long pe-
riods between the adoption of Conventions and their ratification, or 
effectively preventing ratification of Conventions in a number of 
cases.291 
7. The observance of equivalent standards in Australia to those 
required by particular Conventions has been advanced as a ground 
to explain Australia's non-ratification. 292 
Thus, both federal and non-federal factors have been at work in impeding 
Australian ratification of ILO Conventions. The blatant appeal to federalism as a 
pretext to disguise the real reasons for failure to ratify a Convention is, of course, 
a tactic unavailable to a unitary State. On the other hand, it has not been used 
particularly frequently by Australia as an excuse to justify failure to ratify 
particular Conventions. In this context it is more important to assess the role 
played by the established procedure of consultation with the states and its 
operation in particular cases. There are two questions which arise: first, whether 
the adoption of the procedure is itself a fraud on the international community; 
and second, whether utilization of the procedure in practice has been such a 
fraud. 
In a federal state such as Canada, where the central government is legally 
hamstrung in its power to implement treaties on subjects within exclusive state 
competence,293 the accusation that the adoption of a procedure of consultation 
with the provinces was subterfuge cannot be made, although one might jus-
tifiably decry the potentially inhibiting effect that the division of powers may 
have on Canada's participation in international treaties. In the case of Australia, 
288. E.g., the social security conventions based on compulsory contributory schemes, as well as 
Conventions No. 46; No. 61; No. 67, 209 V.N.T.S. 39; No. 74, 94 V.N.T.S. 11; No. 89, 81 V.N.T.S. 
147; and No. 141, _ V.N.T.S. _. 
289. E.g., Conventions No. 95, 138 V.N.T.S. 225; No. 110,348 V.N.T.S. 275; and No. 117,494 
V.N.T.S.249. 
290. E.g., Conventions No. 55, 40 V.N.T.S. 169; No. 81, 54 V.N.T.S. 3; No. 89, 81 U.N.T.S. 147; No. 
101, 196 V.N.T.S. 183; No. 108,389 V.N.T.S. 277. 
291. See supra text accompanying notes 252-59. 
292. E.g., Conventions No. 30, 39 V.N.T.S. 85; No. 53, 40 V.N.T.S. 153; No. 115,431 V.N.T.S. 41; 
No. 120, 560 V.N.T.S. 201. 
293. See, e.g., Attorney-General (Canada) v. Attorney-General (Ontario), (1937) A.C. 326; A. GOTLlEB, 
CANADIAN TREATy-MAKING 75-76 (1968). 
1985] TASMANIAN DAMS CASE 327 
the issue is not so clear, and one'sjudgment will depend to a large extent on one's 
reading of the history of the external affairs power. If one takes the view that 
Burgess definitively established the broad view, 294 one will be inclined to condemn 
the reliance on a more restricted power to justify the necessity for consultation 
with the states as unnecessary. If one takes the view that the broad view of Burgess 
would not necessarily have been applied to uphold federal legislation imple-
menting ILO Conventions during the 1950s and 1960s,295 one is less likely to 
pass such an adverse judgment, although one may be critical of the lack of 
political courage on the part of governments to test the limits of the power. On 
this second view, one is critical not of the use of the Australian federal system as a 
subterfuge to disguise a lack of commitment to particular international policies, 
but of the retarding effect that the internal division of power between federal 
and state governments has had on Australia's participation in international 
treaty regimes.296 
It is at the structural level that Australian federalism makes its major contribu-
tion. Australia's support for the ILO federal clause and its practice of referring 
Conventions to the states are justified by the argument that it is more appropri-
ate for state governments to implement many of these Conventions. This per-
ception of propriety has been based in the past partly on the uncertainty of the 
limits of the external affairs power. It has also, and perhaps more importantly, 
been based on the history of regulation at the state level of the matters covered 
by the Conventions, as well as on the institutional and political problems that 
might have arisen had a course other than this been adopted. 
The divided competence of the Australian federal system thus impedes the 
acceptance and implementation of international labor standards. If a federal 
government eschews a policy of unilateral implementation in favor of coopera-
tive implementation, consultation with the states will be necessary to enable 
utilization of state structures and resources. Even given the case of a federal 
government committed to the implementation of ILO standards, experience has 
shown that the existence of eight separate governments (the seven states and the 
Northern Territory297), almost invariably of different political persuasions and 
jealous of their own autonomy, militates against the attainment of agreement. 
The nature of the consultative process and the requirement of unanimous 
consent means that such agreement, if reached at all, is inordinately delayed. 
It is these factors which distinguish the position of the Australian federal 
294. Connell, supra note 95, takes this approach. 
295. D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 318 (1965), takes this approach. 
296. This is not, however, to rule out the justifiability of criticism directed to the use of federalism as 
a pretext in those specific cases where the subject matter of a Convention is under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth and failure to ratify is justified by reference to the purported 
necessity for consultation with the states. 
297. The Northern Territory, a federal territory, was granted quasi-statehood in 1978 under the 
Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth). 
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system from that of a unitary state. Both federal and unitary states experience 
political struggles between various interest groups over ILO standards, but the 
inherent potential for intergovernmental conflict in a federal state is an addi-
tional and different sort of problem that has a retarding effect of its own quite 
apart from the conflict between the parties most directly concerned. 
The retarding effect of federalism on Australia's participation in multilateral 
treaties has been evident in the case of the ILO over a long period of time, and its 
continuing impact has been ensured by the institutionalization of the process of 
consultation. In the next section, Australia's record in relation to human rights 
instruments and other multilateral instruments is analyzed in an attempt to 
ascertain the impact of the federal structure in the context of those conventions. 
C. Australia and Human Rights Instruments 298 
Australia has been prepared to ratify without much hesitation such human 
rights instruments as the Genocide Convention299 and slavery conventions,30o 
primarily because they did not require domestic implementation, nor did they 
intrude upon matters traditionally reserved to the states. In cases involving more 
controversial topics, or subjects within traditional state competence, the behavior 
familiar in the ILO context has been evident: reliance on a restricted reading of 
the external affairs power, support for the insertion of federal clauses, and the 
adoption of the procedure of consultation with the states in order to obtain their 
agreement to ratification. 3D ! 
Nonetheless, non-federal factors also seem to have played an important role. 
As previously discussed,3D2 a commitment to international human rights at the 
federal level has been greater in the case of Labor governments than in the case 
of conservative governments. As the lesser commitment of conservative govern-
ments to human rights has generally gone hand-in-hand with a belief in the 
preservation of states' rights, substantive disagreement with international stan-
dards as well as the federal system has contributed to a reluctance to ratify a 
number of Conventions. While the fragmentation of authority over a given 
subject and the possibility of political conflict between Canberra and the states 
would not be present in a unitary state, it is difficult to be confident that a 
conservative Australian federal government would have unequivocally ratified 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights even if it had possessed 
298. Australia's performance in relation to human rights instruments has been the subject of recent 
detailed analysis. See, e.g., Charlesworth, supra note 75; Triggs, supra note 214. See also De Stoop, supra 
note 246. Accordingly, this article will not discuss the topic in any detail. 
299. 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (ratified July 8, 1949). 
300. Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, signed Sept. 25, 1926,7 U.S.T. 479, T.I.A.S. No. 
3532,182 U.N .T.S. 51 (definitive signature Dec. 9, 1953); Supplementary Convention on the Abolition 
of Slavery 1956,266 U.N.T.S. 3 (ratified Jan. 6,1958). 
301. See generally Charlesworth, supra note 75, 66-85. 
302. See supra notes 146-230 and accompanying text. 
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an explicit power of treaty implementation. The advantage of the federal system 
is that it provides one more seemingly plausible excuse. 
The 1980 Australian ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (prior to the withdrawal in 1984 of a number of declarations and 
statements)303 is an extreme example of the power of federalism and its utility as 
a shield behind which a lack of substantive commitment can be concealed. 304 
Despite the rejection of proposals to insert a federal clause in the Covenant when 
it was being drafted,305 Australia's ratification attempted to provide its own 
federal clause by advising that implementation of the Covenant would be in 
accordance with its federal system of divided competence. Of doubtful validity as 
a reservation under general international law rules,306 it was a clear example of 
an attempt to gain the benefits of ratification without assuming the full obliga-
tions imposed by the Covenant on all the nations party to the Covenant irrespec-
tive of their constitutional arrangements. It was a powerful indication of the 
impact that federal ideas and states' perceptions of their own autonomy can have 
when combined with a less than wholehearted commitment to a convention. 
Even under the current Hawke Labor government, the forces of federalism 
appear to be taking their toll on the government's human rights program. While 
the government has implemented the Women's Discrimination Convention,307 
the saga of the Human Rights Bill 1973 (Cth) demonstrates that lengthy delay 
can result, even in the context of a strong federal political commitment to human 
rights. The Human Rights Bill, dating originally from 1973, was temporarily 
shelved in 1984 because the government feared that it might suffer electoral 
damage from attacks by the states jealously attempting to preserve intact their 
traditional areas of legislative competence.308 
Thus, the forces of federalism have been particularly strong in the area of 
human rights instruments (other than ILO Conventions). In addition, the fed-
eral system and its use as a subterfuge can be justly criticized when passing 
judgment on Australia's performance in this area. 
D. Australia and Other Multilateral Conventions 
An interesting comparison may be drawn between Australia's record in rela-
tion to the ILO and human rights conventions and its record of ratification of 
Conventions adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO).309 The 
303. For the details of the withdrawal of certain reservations and declarations, see supra text 
accompanying notes 227-29. 
304. See generally Charlesworth, supra note 75. at 75-79; Triggs, supra note 214. 
305. Sorensen, supra note 72, at 199; Looper, supra note 163, at 188-200. 
306. Triggs, supra note 214, at 290-94. See also Charlesworth, supra note 75, at 77-78. 
307. See supra notes 219-223 and accompanying text. 
308. The Age (Melbourne), Mar. 22. 1984, at 6. For further setbacks to the Bill of Rights and the 
current position, see supra note 224. 
309. The 1MO was formerly known as the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. 
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objectives of the IMO, which was founded in 1948, are to provide machinery for 
cooperation between governments in the field of technical aspects of shipping, 
particularly maritime safety and efficiency of navigation, and to encourage the 
removal of discriminatory action and unnecessary restrictions on shipping en-
gaged in international trade.310 
The following table lists the number of Conventions adopted by the IMO 
which have been ratified by the countries named as of December 31, 1983 (See 
Table III). 
TABLE III 
NUMBER OF IMO CONVENTIONS RATIFIED BY SELECTED STATES 
(AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1983)311 
Federal State 
United Kingdom 
Federal Republic of Germany 












An examination of the history of the Conventions which have not been ratified 
by Australia shows a somewhat curious side to Australian treaty practice. Under 
the Constitution, the federal government has legislative power over interstate 
and international trade and commerce (including shipping).312 The states have 
control over intrastate shipping and may legislate with respect to coastal waters 
to the extent that the Commonwealth has not passed preemptive federallegisla-
tion. 
Most ofthe Conventions adopted by the IMO deal with matters that fall within 
federal power and that are already subject to a certain degree of federal regula-
tion. A number of the Conventions deal with topics that are the subject of 
concurrent state regulatory power. Although on the whole Australia does not 
appear to have had any objections to the policies embodied in the Conventions, 
For a more detailed discussion of Australia's participation in the various IMO Conventions (including 
recent Australian legislation), see Burmester, Australia and the Law of the Sea - TM Protection and 
Preservation of the Marine Environment, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA (K. W. Ryan 2d ed. 1984) 
439, 444-55. 
310. See Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization 1948,9 U.S.T. 
621, T.I.A.S. No. 4044, 289 U.N.T.S. 48. 
311. The figures in Table Ill, are based on information contained in International Maritime 
Organization, STATUS OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
ORGANIZATION OR ITS SECRETARy-GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITARY OR OTHER FUNCTIONS [hereinafter 
cited as IMO REPORT] (1984) (ratifications as of Dec. 31, 1983). 
312. AUSTL. CONST., §§ 51(1), 98. 
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the time required for Australia to ratify those which it has ratified has been 
long313 and a large number of Conventions remain unratified.314 
A Commission of Inquiry into the Maritime Industry published a report in 
1976 concerning the status of these IMO Conventions, together with recom-
mendations for action by the federal government.315 The Commission consid-
ered that it was important that Australia ratify a number of Conventions within 
federal competence as soon as possible, and it noted that the relevant depart-
ments were in most cases moving towards recommending ratification.316 By 
1981, however, only one of these Conventions had been ratified. 317 
Certainly part of the explanation for Australia's record in this area must lie in 
the process of consultation with the states, a process apparently adopted in those 
cases in which the states already had relevant legislation. It is not clear from the 
Maritime Report how many of the Conventions had in fact been referred to the 
states, but Australia's prompt ratification of the Conventions relating to the 
International Maritime Satellite Organization318 (a matter clearly within exclu-
313. Commission of Inquiry into the Maritime Industry, REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
CONVENTIONS 9 (1976) [hereinafter cited as MARITIME REpORT]. 
314. The Australian record at the end of 1983 (see Table llI) may be compared with the correspond-
ing figures at the end of 1980: 
NUMBER OF 1MO CONVENTIONS R,ATIFIED BY SELECTED STATES 
(AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1980) 
State 
United Kingdom 
United States of America 












IMO REPORT, supra note 311, (1981 ed.) (ratifications as of December 31, 1980). It is difficult to know 
whether the spurt of activity by Australia (eleven ratifications in three years, eight of those after the 
Labor Party's coming to power in March 1983) is the result of the Labor Party's commitment to an 
energetic use of its foreign affairs power, or whether it represents the fruition of a process of 
consultation and adjustment, The latter seems more likely, See note 318 infra, 
315, MARITIME REPORT, supra note 313, 
316. Id. at 25, 26, 33, 34, Included among these unratified Conventions were the Great Barrier Reef 
Amendments to the International Convention for the Prevention of the Pollution of the Sea by Oil 
1954, 327 U.N.T.S. 3 which brought the Great Barrier Reef, off the Australian coast, within the 
category of prohibited discharge areas. Although these particular amendments were proposed by 
Australia, they were not ratified by Australia until November 13, 1981. 
317. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972,28 U.S.T. 
3459, T.I.A.S. No. 8587 (acceded to by Australia on Feb. 29, 1980). 
318. Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization 1976, 31 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. 
No. 9605 (ratified by Australia on Mar. 16, 1979); Operating Agreement on the International Maritime 
Satellite Organization 1976,31 U.S.T. 135, T.I.A.S. No. 9605 (effective signature by Australia July 16, 
1979). Information received in June 1985 from the Federal Department of Transport after the 
completion of this article gives some indication of the extent of continuing state involvement since the 
1979 Offshore Constitutional Settlement (see generally notes 211 and 309 supra). It appears that the states 
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sive federal jurisdiction) would seem to indicate that bureaucratic delay, the 
difficulties of drafting implementing legislation, or the problems involved in 
consulting with the states must be the explanation for Australia's record of 
tardiness in ratification. 
Another case in which the federal system has delayed accession to a multilat-
eral convention was the New York Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.319 As early as 1959 all states had indicated 
their willingness to agree to ratification, and by 1969 there was a firm agreement 
between the Commonwealth and states that Australia would ratify the Conven-
tion in advance of the passage of uniform state legislation throughout the 
country.320 Four years later only three states had passed the necessary legislation, 
and the Convention remained unratified.321 Not until seventeen years after the 
Convention was opened for signature did Australia finally accede to it, and only 
then on the basis of a uniform federal statute. For that period, Australia was 
denied the benefits of the Convention, including the simplification of the en-
forcement of awards and arbitration agreements, as well as the strengthening of 
Australia's position as a trading nation.322 This was a direct result of inaction on 
the part of three states and, it would seem, the federal government's failure to 
press them.323 
One area in which the federal system does not seem to have been a significant 
impediment to the implementation of treaty obligations has been the area of 
narcotics control. All states had agreed by 1962 to the ratification of the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961,324 and the delay in ratification 6f it until 
1967 was due to the need to amend a large amount of detailed legislation. This 
are consulted during negotiations and after conclusion of the treaty in cases where the treaty infringes 
on state responsibilities. If the states do not approve of a convention which is substantially within their 
responsibilities, normally the federal government will not ratify it. The failure of the states to pass 
complementary legislation is the cause of Australia's failure to ratify at least one convention (1973178 
Marpol Convention). Delays in the implementation of other conventions have resulted from the 
necessity to draft complex secondary legislation and to consult with the states and maritime industry. 
319. 21 V.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 V.N.T.S. 3. Traditionally, the states had regulated the 
enforcement of foreign judgments. 
320. 92 AUSTL. PARL. DEB., H.R., 4390-93 (1974) (second reading speech of the Minister for 
Manufacturing Industry on the Arbitration (Foreign Awards and Agreements) Act 1974 (Cth». See also 
43 Au STL. L.J. 344-45 (1969). 
321. The states which had passed the necessary legislation were New South Wales, Queensland and 
Tasmania. Yorston & Fortescue, AUSTRALIAN MERCANTILE LAW 529-30 (C. Turner 16 ed. 1981). 
322. 43 AUSTL. LJ. 344-45 (1969). 
323. It would also appear that the failure by Australia to become a party to most of the Conventions 
of the Hague Conference on Private International Law is attributable to the divided competence of the 
Australian federal system. The Hague Conference on Private International Law, the statute of which 
appears at 220 V.N.T.S. 121, produces many conventions in the field of private international law. See 22 
INT'L LECAL MATERIALS 1417, 1418 (1983) for an indication of the number of conventions produced by 
the Conference. For Australia's record in comparison to other countries, see the table in 22 INT'L LEGAL 
MATERIALS 1417 (1983). See generally, Leal, Federal State Clause and the Conventions of the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law, 8 DALHOUSIE L.J. 257 (1984). 
324. 18 V.S.T. 1407, T.l.A.S. No. 6298, 520 V.N.T.S. 204. 
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is, however, an atypical case - on few issues do state and federal governments 
agree more than on narcotics control, and this is one in which federal/state 
cooperation has been close. 325 
Thus, even outside the contentious areas of ILO Conventions and human 
rights instruments, the federal system seems to have had a retarding effect on 
Australia's participation in international treaties. Even where the federal gov-
ernment has undoubted power to legislate, the concurrent powers of the states 
and the political pressures wielded by them have led to delay in ratifying 
conventions, and in some cases, to failure to ratify them at all. In some instances, 
however, such as in the case of the unratified IMO Conventions, it is difficult to 
know whether other factors may have been just as important as the forces of the 
federal system. 
E. The Likely Impact of the Dams Case on Australian Treaty Practice 
The discussion above has shown that, while the role that the federal structure 
has played in influencing Australian treaty practice has been significant, there 
have been other factors at work as well. Nonetheless, the existence of the 
Australian federal system will continue to be an important factor in analyzing 
Australian participation in the international order and an obstacle to be 
negotiated by federal governments of any political color. This section discusses 
the options that are open to a federal government in the wake of the Dams case, 
and assesses these options from the point of view ofthe effective implementation 
of treaties. 
Now that the federal government's power to implement treaties has been 
confirmed by the Dams case, the federal government must choose from among 
the following courses of action in relation to implementing treaties dealing with 
matters traditionally subject to state regulation: (1) act according to previous 
practice and not ratify conventions unless all states agree to ratification; (2) not 
consult with the states on the issue of ratification and implementation but simply 
pass uniform federal legislation which would preempt inconsistent state laws; or 
(3) if the process of consultation is excessively delayed or if some or all of the 
states refuse to agree to ratification and implementation, the federal government 
could enact legislation of its own, or coordinate its own efforts with those of the 
states which are prepared to cooperate.326 
If the first course is possible, there would be no need for federal legislation 
that would apply nationwide, although in some cases the federal government 
325. See generally REpORT OF THE AUSTRALIAN ROYAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO DRUGS (1980), bk. 
A, pt. V., A355-420; and bk. D, pt. XIV, chs. 2-3, 017-34. 
326. Another alternative would be to involve the states at all stages of the treaty process, including 
negotiation and signature. Although there have been state representatives in Australian delegations to 
the Law of the Sea Conference and a number of other international bodies, a policy of representation as 
a regular matter seems unlikely to be adopted. 
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may consider that national uniformity is necessary or desirable. As discussed 
earlier, when treaties cover either controversial subject matter or matters viewed 
by states as within their own domain, there is likely to be opposition from one or 
more states.327 In the face of noncooperation from just one state, the federal 
government must, if committed to the implementation of the treaty, enact 
uniform national legislation with the accompanying legal and administrative 
problems that such a course may entail. 
Recent Australian experience shows the difficulties that may arise in such a 
situation. In 1975, for example, the federal Labor government passed the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), the legislation challenged in Koowarta v. Bjelke-
Petersen.328 The Act outlawed racial discrimination and established a federal 
administrative office to deal with complaints made under it. In 1977, the State of 
New South Wales passed its Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (N.S.W.), which out-
lawed discrimination on a number of grounds including race and which estab-
lished an investigative board and a quasi-judicial tribunal to deal with complaints 
of discrimination.329 Thus, since 1977 in New South Wales, there have been 
apparently two avenues of legal redress open to a person complaining of racial 
discrimination. 
In 1983, the inevitable happened. A defendant to an action under the New 
South Wales statute argued that the state provisions dealing with racial discrimi-
nation were preempted by the federal Act and were therefore invalid to the 
extent of the inconsistency, pursuant to section 109 of the Constitution. The 
High Court agreed with this argument. 330 Ironically, the remedies available to 
the complainant under state law were superior to those available under federal 
law. This was because the doctrine of separation of powers, which operates at the 
federal level, prevents a federal body from exercising the administrative func-
tions of investigation and conciliation in addition to the judicial functions of 
awarding damages and other remedies. 331 Thus, by attempting to ensure that all 
Australians enjoyed a minimum standard in the area of racial discrimination, the 
federal government unwittingly deprived persons in some states of a higher level 
of protection. 332 
327. See supra text accompanying notes 296-97. 
328. (1982) 56 Austl. LJ.R. 625. 
329. See id. 
330. Viskauskas v. Niland, (1983) 47 Austl. L.R. 32. 
331. See R. v. Kirby ex parte The Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956), 94 C.L.R. 254. See generally 
L. Zines, supra note 30, at 137-45. 
332. A similar situation arose in Gerhardy v. Brown, (1983) 49 Austl. L.R. 169, in which the Supreme 
Court of South Australia held that section 9 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) preempted 
section 19(1) of the Pitiantjatiara Land Rights Act 1981 (S.A.), which made it an offense for a person 
who was not a member of the Pitiantiatjara tribe to enter the tribe's traditional lands without the 
permission of the body corporate in whom those lands had been vested (consisting of all members of the 
tribe). The case was removed to the High Court on the preemption issue. The Court held that the State 
law was not inconsistent with the Commonwealth law because the federal law specifically permitted the 
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An attempt was made to rectify the situation by declaring in an amendment to 
the Act that it was not intended to apply so as to limit the operation of a state act 
furthering the objects of the Racial Discrimination Convention and capable of 
operating concurrently with the federal Act.333 It is not clear whether this 
provision will effectively preserve the operation of the state law; if it does not, 
serious problems may arise in encouraging the states to provide for higher 
standards than the federal minimum standard (which would reflect the mini-
mum standard required by international law).334 The outcome will be of vital 
importance in view of the present federal sex and race discrimination legislation 
and, ultimately perhaps, a Bill of Rights. 
Part of the justification for the insistence of federal governments on consulting 
and cooperating with the states has been the very practical issue of the detailed 
implementation and enforcement of treaties. The states generally have legisla-
tive and administrative structures already in place in areas which have tradition-
ally been regulated by them (for example, minimum wages and working condi-
tions, safety of machinery, workers' compensation). If the agreement of a state 
government to the implementation of a convention can be obtained, it avoids the 
necessity of enacting federal legislation and of devoting federal resources to the 
establishment of a parallel administrative structure. 
Cooperation with willing states can significantly advance the efficient im-
plementation and oversight of international human rights standards in Au-
stralia; indeed, it may be the only way to make a coherent scheme accessible to 
the intended beneficiaries. For example, in the three Australian states which at 
present have human rights legislation, "a person with a human rights complaint 
already faces a bewildering miscellany of institutions which may be able to help, 
and the situation becomes more rather than less confusing as each new develop-
ment in human rights law and practice occurs."335 Such a position involves 
taking of special measures to secure the advancement of disadvantaged groups in accordance with 
Article 1(4) of the Racial Discrimination Convention and the State law was such a special measure: 
(1985) 57 Austl. L.R. 472. 
333. Racial Discrimination Amendment Act 1983 (Cth), § 3. A similar provision appears in the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). In University of Wollongong v. Metwally, (1984) 56 Austl. L.R. I, the 
High Court held by a majority that the new section 6A of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) was 
ineffective in its attempt to validate retrospectively the New South Wales law making racial discrimina-
tion unlawful. It has not yet been decided whether the new section will save the operation of state laws as 
of the date of commencement of the section. 
334. The unanimous decision of the High Court In re Duncan ex parte Australian Iron & Steel Pty. 
Ltd., (1983) 49 Austl. L.R. 19 (upholding the joint federal/state Coal Industry Tribunal established in 
1946 to regulate the coal industry) shows a readiness on the part of the Court to uphold such 
cooperative arrangements and to refrain from finding preemption of state laws when the federal 
government manifests an intention to regulate an area jointly with the states. See id. at 38 (Mason, J .), 
and 54 (Brennan, J.). Whether this means that the court will find that there is no inconsistency between 
federal and state legislation in the areas of race and sex discrimination is, however, somewhat doubtful 
in the absence of a joint federal state body in the area. 
335. Speech by the then Attorney-General, Sen. Evans, to the Australian Legal Convention, July 7, 
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considerable duplication of effort and resources and is unsatisfactory from the 
point of view of the consumer, whose preference would be for "one stop shop-
ping." One obvious method by which this problem can be partially overcome is to 
build on existing state machinery and to delegate functions under federallegisla-
tion to state officials or to joint federaVstate bodies.336 Such a move would allow 
more federal resources to be concentrated in the states in which there is no 
legislation or administrative structure. 
Thus, immediate unilateral action at the federal level in ratifying and imple-
menting treaties may in many cases be a mixed blessing for the individuals 
intended to benefit from the action. From the perspective of the consumer, and 
to promote the efficient use of community resources, consultation and coopera-
tion with the states in the implementation of such treaties may be clearly prefer-
able to unilateral federal action. 
It would be naive to assert that either unilateral federal implementation of a 
treaty or joint federal/state legal and administrative action will produce a totally 
unified and simple system. A policy of ensuring a minimum level of human 
rights guarantees at the federal level, without nullifying state initiatives to offer a 
higher level of protection, inevitably perpetuates a dual system of laws. Uniform 
federal implementation must be weighed against the available federal resources 
and the willingness of the states to make available their resources; joint action 
must be weighed against the national and international need for speedy and 
uniform national implementation. 
The time has come for the Australian federal government to assume the 
responsibilities imposed upon it by the international order, and to ensure that 
the international policies for which it expresses support become reality within 
Australia. The federal government must stop taking refuge in self-doubts about 
its legal power and the propriety of action. The demands inherent in the federal 
system should be accommodated, but when that accommodation obstructs the 
achievement of desirable international policies that the federal government 
supports, the government should have the courage to exercise its undoubted 
legal power to surmount that obstruction. 
F. Australia and Federal Clauses - The Future? 
The Dams case apparently makes it unnecessary in almost all cases for Au-
stralia to insist on the insertion of federal clauses in multilateral instruments or to 
rely on such clauses. This does not mean, however, that Australia will be unable 
to continue to rely on the asserted demands of its federal system in order to 
1983, at 30. Western Australians will be in the same positions when the Equal Opportunity Act 1984 
(W.A.) commences operation in mid-1985. 
336. E.g., the arrangement between the federal Human Rights Commission and the Victorian 
Commissioner for Equal Opportunity, announced June 30,1983, designating the latter the delegate of 
the former for certain purposes. !d. at 33. 
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assume lesser obligations than unitary states. This is the result of the different 
forms of federal clauses used in treaties and of the large number of treaties 
containing federal clauses to which Australia is already a party. 
The federal clause in the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage337 is an example of the type of federal 
clause on which Australia would no longer be able to rely to excuse its non-
performance of obligations under a treaty. The federal government can no 
longer maintain in good faith that it does not possess the legal jurisdiction to 
implement treaties. 
Nonetheless, there are other instances of federal clauses on which Australia 
could still rely. The obvious example is Article 19(7) of the ILO Constitution,33B 
the self-judging federal clause inserted in the ILO Constitution in 1946 in the 
hope that it would increase the adherence of federal states to ILO conventions. 339 
The clause provides that in the case of Conventions which "the federal govern-
ment regards as appropriate under its constitutional system for federal action," 
the obligations of federal states are to be the same as those of unitary states; in 
respect of those obligations which the federal government regards "as appropri-
ate under its constitutional system, in whole or part, for action by the constituent 
states," the federal government is under lesser obligations of notification, consul-
tation, and reporting.340 
As ILO Conventions will continue to be important sources of international 
obligations for Australia, this clause is of particular interest. There is apparently 
nothing to prevent a federal government from continuing to follow the practice 
of referring Conventions to the states, at least with respect to Conventions not 
within exclusive federal jurisdiction, on the basis that past practice and adminis-
trative convenience make it more appropriate for the states to implement such 
Conventions. 341 
It is unlikely that Australia will support the insertion in the multilateral treaties 
of the first type of federal clause on the ground that it is applicable to its own 
constitutional position, and it is improbable that such a step would be received 
kindly. Support for the insertion of the second type of federal clause in new 
multilateral instruments may well depend on the political commitment of the 
federal government to particular domestic and international policies. In sum, it 
337. 27 U.S.T. 37, T.1.A.S. 8226,1037 U.N.T.S. 151. For text of Article 34,seesupra text accompany-
ing note 139-40. 
338. I.L.O. CONST .. 15 U.N.T.S. 36, 76-80, art. 19(7). 
339. Looper, supra note 163, at 179-86. See also 1. BERNIER, supra note 24, at 175-77. 
340. 15 U.N.T.S. 35,68-80. The full text of Article 19 also appears in the collection, International 
Labour Organization, International Labour Conventions and Recommendations 1919-1981, at vii-x 
(1982). 
341. For example, the Swiss federal government, which possesses the legal power to implement 
treaties, has not considered it appropriate in many cases for it, rather than the constituent cantons, to 
carry out the provisions of treaties. Looper, supra note 163, at 183-84. 
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would seem probable that a Labor government would be less keen than a 
conservative government to support the insertion of federal clauses or to rely on 
them.342 The institutional and practical pressures discussed above, however, may 
make the differences in the respective approaches of the Labor and conservative 
governments negligible. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The growth of the external affairs power in Australia is a development that 
was to be expected in light of the steady expansion of federal power that had 
taken place since federation. The changing nature ofthe international order has 
ruled out the possibility of classifying some subjects as "inherently international" 
and others as "inherently domestic" in character. Therefore, to attempt to 
distinguish between two sets of treaty obligations on the ground that one but not 
the other is of "genuine international concern" is an undertaking which involves 
the judiciary in an invidious and almost impossible task. 
The examination of Australia's practice in relation to ILO Conventions, 
human rights instruments and other multilateral treaties has shown that the 
federal system has been used on a number of occasions as a smokescreen behind 
which a lack of commitment to a particular policy can conveniently be hidden. 
Apart from this extreme use of federalism as a pretext to excuse failure to ratify 
or to implement a treaty, Australia's support for the insertion of federal clauses 
in conventions, and its willingness to rely on them to excuse its non-
performance, have had the effect of producing an inequality of obligation 
between Australia and unitary states, while allowing Australia to derive the 
benefits of being seen to endorse particular conventions. 
There seems little doubt that federal factors have not been the only causes of 
Australia's poor record of ratifications and delay. The examination of the prog-
ress of a number of multilateral conventions dealing with different subjects 
shows the other factors that may be at work in any particular case, whether they 
be openly avowed disagreement with the content of a convention, the lack of 
resources to implement the treaty quickly and effectively, political or bureau-
cratic inertia, or an attitude of indifference to the demands of the international 
order. For most of these fi:lilings Australia may justly be criticized. 
Nonetheless, one is forced to conclude that the federal system and the institu-
tional and political difficulties that federalism engenders have been extremely 
important in retarding Australian participation in international treaty regimes. 
Not only has the politically desirable procedure of consulting with the states 
permitted the development of the one state veto, but the goal of obtaining the 
agreement of even a majority of states within a reasonable time has eluded every 
342. The Hawke Government has made clear its unwillingness to seek the insertion of federal clauses 
in multinational treaties. See note 228 supra. 
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federal government. This may be partly attributed to the failure of the federal 
government to press the states when they do not respond to its initiatives with 
reasonable speed, but the existence of an additional tier of government creates 
organizational problems which would not be present in a unitary state. These 
problems have had a severely inhibiting effect on Australia's participation in 
international treaty regimes. 
Despite all these criticisms, the Australian federal government will still have to 
cope with the continued existence of the federal system, albeit with one more 
weapon in its arsenal. However, because the states possess legal and administra-
tive structures already in place in areas which are the subject of the contentious 
treaties, the efficient use of resources and the effective and unified implementa-
tion of a treaty may best be achieved by cooperation with the states, either by 
their performing functions as delegates of federal power, or by establishing joint 
federal/state bodies. 
Despite the Dams decision and the differences in philosophy between the 
Labor and conservative parties in relation to the international order and the 
exploitation of the external affairs power, the realities of political life in Australia 
will continue to exert a considerable dampening effect on any desire a Labor 
government may have to exploit the power to the full. The federal government 
does now, however, possess a valuable bargaining chip which may push the states 
into being more cooperative than they have ever been previously. 
In any event, the achievement of human rights standards that conform to the 
requirements of international law will be advanced further as a result of the Dams 
case. This is not to say that either the political or legal battle against expanding 
federal power is over. Rather, the political battle continues to rage, and the 
states' rights advocates have just fallen back to their next line of defense. 
